611 ideas
| 11300 | Agathon: good [PG] |
| 11301 | Aisthesis: perception, sensation, consciousness [PG] |
| 11302 | Aitia / aition: cause, explanation [PG] |
| 11303 | Akrasia: lack of control, weakness of will [PG] |
| 11304 | Aletheia: truth [PG] |
| 11305 | Anamnesis: recollection, remembrance [PG] |
| 11306 | Ananke: necessity [PG] |
| 11307 | Antikeimenon: object [PG] |
| 11375 | Apatheia: unemotional [PG] |
| 11308 | Apeiron: the unlimited, indefinite [PG] |
| 11376 | Aphairesis: taking away, abstraction [PG] |
| 11309 | Apodeixis: demonstration [PG] |
| 11310 | Aporia: puzzle, question, anomaly [PG] |
| 11311 | Arche: first principle, the basic [PG] |
| 11312 | Arete: virtue, excellence [PG] |
| 11313 | Chronismos: separation [PG] |
| 11314 | Diairesis: division [PG] |
| 11315 | Dialectic: dialectic, discussion [PG] |
| 11316 | Dianoia: intellection [cf. Noesis] [PG] |
| 11317 | Diaphora: difference [PG] |
| 11318 | Dikaiosune: moral goodness, justice [PG] |
| 11319 | Doxa: opinion, belief [PG] |
| 11320 | Dunamis: faculty, potentiality, capacity [PG] |
| 11321 | Eidos: form, idea [PG] |
| 11322 | Elenchos: elenchus, interrogation [PG] |
| 11323 | Empeiron: experience [PG] |
| 11324 | Energeia: employment, actuality, power? [PG] |
| 11325 | Enkrateia: control [PG] |
| 11326 | Entelecheia: entelechy, having an end [PG] |
| 11327 | Epagoge: induction, explanation [PG] |
| 11328 | Episteme: knowledge, understanding [PG] |
| 11329 | Epithumia: appetite [PG] |
| 11330 | Ergon: function [PG] |
| 11331 | Eristic: polemic, disputation [PG] |
| 11332 | Eros: love [PG] |
| 11333 | Eudaimonia: flourishing, happiness, fulfilment [PG] |
| 11334 | Genos: type, genus [PG] |
| 11335 | Hexis: state, habit [PG] |
| 11336 | Horismos: definition [PG] |
| 11337 | Hule: matter [PG] |
| 11338 | Hupokeimenon: subject, underlying thing [cf. Tode ti] [PG] |
| 11339 | Kalos / kalon: beauty, fineness, nobility [PG] |
| 11340 | Kath' hauto: in virtue of itself, essentially [PG] |
| 11341 | Kinesis: movement, process [PG] |
| 11342 | Kosmos: order, universe [PG] |
| 11343 | Logos: reason, account, word [PG] |
| 11344 | Meson: the mean [PG] |
| 11345 | Metechein: partaking, sharing [PG] |
| 11377 | Mimesis: imitation, fine art [PG] |
| 11346 | Morphe: form [PG] |
| 11347 | Noesis: intellection, rational thought [cf. Dianoia] [PG] |
| 11348 | Nomos: convention, law, custom [PG] |
| 11349 | Nous: intuition, intellect, understanding [PG] |
| 11350 | Orexis: desire [PG] |
| 11351 | Ousia: substance, (primary) being, [see 'Prote ousia'] [PG] |
| 11352 | Pathos: emotion, affection, property [PG] |
| 11353 | Phantasia: imagination [PG] |
| 11354 | Philia: friendship [PG] |
| 11355 | Philosophia: philosophy, love of wisdom [PG] |
| 11356 | Phronesis: prudence, practical reason, common sense [PG] |
| 11357 | Physis: nature [PG] |
| 11358 | Praxis: action, activity [PG] |
| 11359 | Prote ousia: primary being [PG] |
| 11360 | Psuche: mind, soul, life [PG] |
| 11361 | Sophia: wisdom [PG] |
| 11362 | Sophrosune: moderation, self-control [PG] |
| 11363 | Stoicheia: elements [PG] |
| 11364 | Sullogismos: deduction, syllogism [PG] |
| 11365 | Techne: skill, practical knowledge [PG] |
| 11366 | Telos: purpose, end [PG] |
| 11367 | Theoria: contemplation [PG] |
| 11368 | Theos: god [PG] |
| 11369 | Ti esti: what-something-is, essence [PG] |
| 11370 | Timoria: vengeance, punishment [PG] |
| 11371 | To ti en einai: essence, what-it-is-to-be [PG] |
| 11372 | To ti estin: essence [PG] |
| 11373 | Tode ti: this-such, subject of predication [cf. hupokeimenon] [PG] |
| 11461 | 323 (roughly): Euclid wrote 'Elements', summarising all of geometry [PG] |
| 11390 | 1000 (roughly): Upanishads written (in Sanskrit); religious and philosophical texts [PG] |
| 11391 | 750 (roughly): the Book of Genesis written by Hebrew writers [PG] |
| 11392 | 586: eclipse of the sun on the coast of modern Turkey was predicted by Thales of Miletus [PG] |
| 11395 | 570: Anaximander flourished in Miletus [PG] |
| 11396 | 563: the Buddha born in northern India [PG] |
| 11398 | 540: Lao Tzu wrote 'Tao Te Ching', the basis of Taoism [PG] |
| 11400 | 529: Pythagoras created his secretive community at Croton in Sicily [PG] |
| 11403 | 500: Heraclitus flourishes at Ephesus, in modern Turkey [PG] |
| 11404 | 496: Confucius travels widely, persuading rulers to be more moral [PG] |
| 11408 | 472: Empedocles persuades his city (Acragas in Sicily) to become a democracy [PG] |
| 11412 | 450 (roughly): Parmenides and Zeno visit Athens from Italy [PG] |
| 11414 | 445: Protagoras helps write laws for the new colony of Thurii [PG] |
| 11417 | 436 (roughly): Anaxagoras is tried for impiety, and expelled from Athens [PG] |
| 11535 | 170 (roughly): Marcus Aurelius wrote his private stoic meditations [PG] |
| 11537 | -200 (roughly): Sextus Empiricus wrote a series of books on scepticism [PG] |
| 11541 | 263: Porphyry began to study with Plotinus in Rome [PG] |
| 11545 | 310: Christianity became the official religion of the Roman empire [PG] |
| 11549 | 387: Ambrose converts Augustine to Christianity [PG] |
| 11555 | 523: Boethius imprisoned at Pavia, and begins to write [PG] |
| 11557 | 529: the emperor Justinian closes all the philosophy schools in Athens [PG] |
| 11421 | 427: Gorgias visited Athens as ambassador for Leontini [PG] |
| 11425 | 399: Socrates executed (with Plato absent through ill health) [PG] |
| 11432 | 387 (roughly): Plato returned to Athens, and founded the Academy [PG] |
| 11433 | 387 (roughly): Aristippus the Elder founder a hedonist school at Cyrene [PG] |
| 11440 | 367: the teenaged Aristotle came to study at the Academy [PG] |
| 11443 | 360 (roughly): Diogenes of Sinope lives in a barrel in central Athens [PG] |
| 11445 | 347: death of Plato [PG] |
| 11454 | 343: Aristotle becomes tutor to 13 year old Alexander (the Great) [PG] |
| 11456 | 335: Arisotle founded his school at the Lyceum in Athens [PG] |
| 11459 | 330 (roughly): Chuang Tzu wrote his Taoist book [PG] |
| 11465 | 322: Aristotle retired to Chalcis, and died there [PG] |
| 11468 | 307 (roughly): Epicurus founded his school at the Garden in Athens [PG] |
| 11470 | 301 (roughly): Zeno of Citium founded Stoicism at the Stoa Poikile in Athens [PG] |
| 11483 | 261: Cleanthes replaced Zeno as head of the Stoa [PG] |
| 11486 | 229 (roughly): Chrysippus replaced Cleanthes has head of the Stoa [PG] |
| 11492 | 157 (roughly): Carneades became head of the Academy [PG] |
| 11509 | 85: most philosophical activity moves to Alexandria [PG] |
| 11513 | 78: Cicero visited the stoic school on Rhodes [PG] |
| 11516 | 60 (roughly): Lucretius wrote his Latin poem on epicureanism [PG] |
| 11528 | 65: Seneca forced to commit suicide by Nero [PG] |
| 11531 | 80: the discourses of the stoic Epictetus are written down [PG] |
| 11564 | 1090: Anselm publishes his proof of the existence of God [PG] |
| 11558 | 622 (roughly): Mohammed writes the Koran [PG] |
| 11559 | 642: Arabs close the philosophy schools in Alexandria [PG] |
| 11560 | 910 (roughly): Al-Farabi wrote Arabic commentaries on Aristotle [PG] |
| 11562 | 1015 (roughly): Ibn Sina (Avicenna) writes a book on Aristotle [PG] |
| 11566 | 1115: Abelard is the chief logic teacher in Paris [PG] |
| 11573 | 1166: Ibn Rushd (Averroes) wrote extensive commentaries on Aristotle [PG] |
| 11581 | 1266: Aquinas began writing 'Summa Theologica' [PG] |
| 11586 | 1280: after his death, the teaching of Aquinas becomes official Dominican doctrine [PG] |
| 11591 | 1328: William of Ockham decides the Pope is a heretic, and moves to Munich [PG] |
| 17916 | 1347: the Church persecutes philosophical heresies [PG] |
| 11593 | 1470: Marsilio Ficino founds a Platonic Academy in Florence [PG] |
| 11596 | 1513: Machiavelli wrote 'The Prince' [PG] |
| 11599 | 1543: Copernicus publishes his heliocentric view of the solar system [PG] |
| 11601 | 1580: Montaigne publishes his essays [PG] |
| 11607 | 1600: Giordano Bruno was burned at the stake in Rome [PG] |
| 11613 | 1619: Descartes's famous day of meditation inside a stove [PG] |
| 11614 | 1620: Bacon publishes 'Novum Organum' [PG] |
| 11619 | 1633: Galileo convicted of heresy by the Inquisition [PG] |
| 11623 | 1641: Descartes publishes his 'Meditations' [PG] |
| 11626 | 1650: death of Descartes, in Stockholm [PG] |
| 11627 | 1651: Hobbes publishes 'Leviathan' [PG] |
| 11633 | 1662: the Port Royal Logic is published [PG] |
| 11634 | 1665: Spinoza writes his 'Ethics' [PG] |
| 11643 | 1676: Leibniz settled as librarian to the Duke of Brunswick [PG] |
| 11649 | 1687: Newton publishes his 'Principia Mathematica' [PG] |
| 11652 | 1690: Locke publishes his 'Essay' [PG] |
| 11654 | 1697: Bayle publishes his 'Dictionary' [PG] |
| 11659 | 1713: Berkeley publishes his 'Three Dialogues' [PG] |
| 11666 | 1734: Voltaire publishes his 'Philosophical Letters' [PG] |
| 11667 | 1739: Hume publishes his 'Treatise' [PG] |
| 11675 | 1762: Rousseau publishes his 'Social Contract' [PG] |
| 11682 | 1781: Kant publishes his 'Critique of Pure Reason' [PG] |
| 11683 | 1785: Reid publishes his essays defending common sense [PG] |
| 11687 | 1798: the French Revolution [PG] |
| 11694 | 1807: Hegel publishes his 'Phenomenology of Spirit' [PG] |
| 11701 | 1818: Schopenhauer publishes his 'World as Will and Idea' [PG] |
| 11710 | 1840: Kierkegaard is writing extensively in Copenhagen [PG] |
| 11713 | 1843: Mill publishes his 'System of Logic' [PG] |
| 11715 | 1848: Marx and Engels publis the Communist Manifesto [PG] |
| 11717 | 1859: Darwin publishes his 'Origin of the Species' [PG] |
| 11721 | 1861: Mill publishes 'Utilitarianism' [PG] |
| 11724 | 1867: Marx begins publishing 'Das Kapital' [PG] |
| 11733 | 1879: Peirce taught for five years at Johns Hopkins University [PG] |
| 17907 | 1879: Frege invents predicate logic [PG] |
| 17909 | 1892: Frege's essay 'Sense and Reference' [PG] |
| 17908 | 1884: Frege publishes his 'Foundations of Arithmetic' [PG] |
| 11735 | 1885: Nietzsche completed 'Thus Spake Zarathustra' [PG] |
| 17911 | 1888: Dedekind publishes axioms for arithmetic [PG] |
| 11740 | 1890: James published 'Principles of Psychology' [PG] |
| 11742 | 1895 (roughly): Freud developed theories of the unconscious [PG] |
| 11745 | 1900: Husserl began developing Phenomenology [PG] |
| 17917 | 1953: Wittgenstein's 'Philosophical Investigations' [PG] |
| 17919 | 1956: Place proposed mind-brain identity [PG] |
| 11804 | 1962: Kuhn's 'Structure of Scientific Revolutions' [PG] |
| 17921 | 1967: Putnam proposed functionalism of the mind [PG] |
| 11808 | 1971: Rawls's 'A Theory of Justice' [PG] |
| 11810 | 1972: Kripke publishes 'Naming and Necessity' [PG] |
| 11813 | 1975: Singer publishes 'Animal Rights' [PG] |
| 17920 | 1975: Putnam published his Twin Earth example [PG] |
| 11820 | 1986: David Lewis publishes 'On the Plurality of Worlds' [PG] |
| 11746 | 1903: Moore published 'Principia Ethica' [PG] |
| 11747 | 1904: Dewey became professor at Columbia University [PG] |
| 17910 | 1908: Zermelo publishes axioms for set theory [PG] |
| 11752 | 1910: Russell and Whitehead begin publishing 'Principia Mathematica' [PG] |
| 11756 | 1912: Russell meets Wittgenstein in Cambridge [PG] |
| 11762 | 1921: Wittgenstein's 'Tractatus' published [PG] |
| 11765 | 1927: Heidegger's 'Being and Time' published [PG] |
| 11768 | 1930: Frank Ramsey dies at 27 [PG] |
| 11770 | 1931: Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems [PG] |
| 11773 | 1933: Tarski's theory of truth [PG] |
| 11783 | 1942: Camus published 'The Myth of Sisyphus' [PG] |
| 11784 | 1943: Sartre's 'Being and Nothingness' [PG] |
| 11787 | 1945: Merleau-Ponty's 'Phenomenology of Perception' [PG] |
| 17918 | 1947: Carnap published 'Meaning and Necessity' [PG] |
| 11794 | 1950: Quine's essay 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism' [PG] |
| 13876 | The syntactic category is primary, and the ontological category is derivative [Frege, by Wright,C] |
| 8415 | Never lose sight of the distinction between concept and object [Frege] |
| 4465 | Note that "is" can assert existence, or predication, or identity, or classification [PG] |
| 9841 | Frege was the first to give linguistic answers to non-linguistic questions [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 9840 | Frege initiated linguistic philosophy, studying number through the sense of sentences [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 15948 | Frege developed formal systems to avoid unnoticed assumptions [Frege, by Lavine] |
| 22270 | Frege changed philosophy by extending logic's ability to check the grounds of thinking [Potter on Frege] |
| 10804 | Thoughts have a natural order, to which human thinking is drawn [Frege, by Yablo] |
| 9832 | Frege sees no 'intersubjective' category, between objective and subjective [Dummett on Frege] |
| 8414 | Keep the psychological and subjective separate from the logical and objective [Frege] |
| 7740 | There exists a realm, beyond objects and ideas, of non-spatio-temporal thoughts [Frege, by Weiner] |
| 8939 | We should not describe human laws of thought, but how to correctly track truth [Frege, by Fisher] |
| 9821 | A definition need not capture the sense of an expression - just get the reference right [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 13886 | Later Frege held that definitions must fix a function's value for every possible argument [Frege, by Wright,C] |
| 16877 | A 'constructive' (as opposed to 'analytic') definition creates a new sign [Frege] |
| 9844 | Originally Frege liked contextual definitions, but later preferred them fully explicit [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 9822 | Nothing should be defined in terms of that to which it is conceptually prior [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 9845 | We can't define a word by defining an expression containing it, as the remaining parts are a problem [Frege] |
| 11219 | Frege suggested that mathematics should only accept stipulative definitions [Frege, by Gupta] |
| 10019 | Only what is logically complex can be defined; what is simple must be pointed to [Frege] |
| 17495 | Proof aims to remove doubts, but also to show the interdependence of truths [Frege] |
| 16878 | We must be clear about every premise and every law used in a proof [Frege] |
| 4686 | Fallacies are errors in reasoning, 'formal' if a clear rule is breached, and 'informal' if more general [PG] |
| 7415 | Question-begging assumes the proposition which is being challenged [PG] |
| 7414 | What is true of a set is also true of its members [PG] |
| 6696 | The Ad Hominem Fallacy criticises the speaker rather than the argument [PG] |
| 8632 | You can't transfer external properties unchanged to apply to ideas [Frege] |
| 5728 | The concept of truth was originated by the senses [Lucretius] |
| 19466 | The word 'true' seems to be unique and indefinable [Frege] |
| 8187 | Frege was strongly in favour of taking truth to attach to propositions [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 22317 | Truth does not admit of more and less [Frege] |
| 13881 | We need to grasp not number-objects, but the states of affairs which make number statements true [Frege, by Wright,C] |
| 19465 | There cannot be complete correspondence, because ideas and reality are quite different [Frege] |
| 19468 | The property of truth in 'It is true that I smell violets' adds nothing to 'I smell violets' [Frege] |
| 4687 | Minimal theories of truth avoid ontological commitment to such things as 'facts' or 'reality' [PG] |
| 18806 | Frege thought traditional categories had psychological and linguistic impurities [Frege, by Rumfitt] |
| 9154 | Frege agreed with Euclid that the axioms of logic and mathematics are known through self-evidence [Frege, by Burge] |
| 9585 | Since every definition is an equation, one cannot define equality itself [Frege] |
| 4971 | I don't use 'subject' and 'predicate' in my way of representing a judgement [Frege] |
| 17745 | For Frege, 'All A's are B's' means that the concept A implies the concept B [Frege, by Walicki] |
| 13455 | Frege did not think of himself as working with sets [Frege, by Hart,WD] |
| 9157 | The null set is only defensible if it is the extension of an empty concept [Frege, by Burge] |
| 16895 | The null set is indefensible, because it collects nothing [Frege, by Burge] |
| 9835 | It is because a concept can be empty that there is such a thing as the empty class [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 14238 | A class is an aggregate of objects; if you destroy them, you destroy the class; there is no empty class [Frege] |
| 9854 | We can introduce new objects, as equivalence classes of objects already known [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 9883 | Frege introduced the standard device, of defining logical objects with equivalence classes [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 18104 | Frege, unlike Russell, has infinite individuals because numbers are individuals [Frege, by Bostock] |
| 9834 | A class is, for Frege, the extension of a concept [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 3328 | Frege proposed a realist concept of a set, as the extension of a predicate or concept or function [Frege, by Benardete,JA] |
| 7728 | Frege has a judgement stroke (vertical, asserting or judging) and a content stroke (horizontal, expressing) [Frege, by Weiner] |
| 16881 | The laws of logic are boundless, so we want the few whose power contains the others [Frege] |
| 7622 | In 1879 Frege developed second order logic [Frege, by Putnam] |
| 9179 | Frege frequently expressed a contempt for language [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 16867 | Logic not only proves things, but also reveals logical relations between them [Frege] |
| 16863 | Does some mathematical reasoning (such as mathematical induction) not belong to logic? [Frege] |
| 16862 | The closest subject to logic is mathematics, which does little apart from drawing inferences [Frege] |
| 13473 | Frege thinks there is an independent logical order of the truths, which we must try to discover [Frege, by Hart,WD] |
| 4975 | A thought can be split in many ways, so that different parts appear as subject or predicate [Frege] |
| 7729 | Frege replaced Aristotle's subject/predicate form with function/argument form [Frege, by Weiner] |
| 8645 | Convert "Jupiter has four moons" into "the number of Jupiter's moons is four" [Frege] |
| 8490 | First-level functions have objects as arguments; second-level functions take functions as arguments [Frege] |
| 8492 | Relations are functions with two arguments [Frege] |
| 3319 | Frege gives a functional account of predication so that we can dispense with predicates [Frege, by Benardete,JA] |
| 6076 | For Frege, predicates are names of functions that map objects onto the True and False [Frege, by McGinn] |
| 16891 | Despite Gödel, Frege's epistemic ordering of all the truths is still plausible [Frege, by Burge] |
| 16906 | The primitive simples of arithmetic are the essence, determining the subject, and its boundaries [Frege, by Jeshion] |
| 16865 | 'Theorems' are both proved, and used in proofs [Frege] |
| 8447 | In 'Etna is higher than Vesuvius' the whole of Etna, including all the lava, can't be the reference [Frege] |
| 18772 | We can treat designation by a few words as a proper name [Frege] |
| 10424 | A Fregean proper name has a sense determining an object, instead of a concept [Frege, by Sainsbury] |
| 18773 | People may have different senses for 'Aristotle', like 'pupil of Plato' or 'teacher of Alexander' [Frege] |
| 8448 | Any object can have many different names, each with a distinct sense [Frege] |
| 14075 | Proper name in modal contexts refer obliquely, to their usual sense [Frege, by Gibbard] |
| 4978 | The meaning of a proper name is the designated object [Frege] |
| 10510 | Frege ascribes reference to incomplete expressions, as well as to singular terms [Frege, by Hale] |
| 18937 | If sentences have a 'sense', empty name sentences can be understood that way [Frege, by Sawyer] |
| 18940 | It is a weakness of natural languages to contain non-denoting names [Frege] |
| 18939 | In a logically perfect language every well-formed proper name designates an object [Frege] |
| 13733 | Frege considered definite descriptions to be genuine singular terms [Frege, by Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
| 9950 | A quantifier is a second-level predicate (which explains how it contributes to truth-conditions) [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
| 9991 | For Frege the variable ranges over all objects [Frege, by Tait] |
| 10536 | Frege's domain for variables is all objects, but modern interpretations first fix the domain [Dummett on Frege] |
| 9871 | Frege always, and fatally, neglected the domain of quantification [Dummett on Frege] |
| 7730 | Frege introduced quantifiers for generality [Frege, by Weiner] |
| 7742 | Frege reduced most quantifiers to 'everything' combined with 'not' [Frege, by McCullogh] |
| 9874 | Contradiction arises from Frege's substitutional account of second-order quantification [Dummett on Frege] |
| 14236 | Each horse doesn't fall under the concept 'horse that draws the carriage', because all four are needed [Oliver/Smiley on Frege] |
| 13824 | Proof theory began with Frege's definition of derivability [Frege, by Prawitz] |
| 13609 | Frege produced axioms for logic, though that does not now seem the natural basis for logic [Frege, by Kaplan] |
| 16884 | Basic truths of logic are not proved, but seen as true when they are understood [Frege, by Burge] |
| 9462 | Frege is intensionalist about reference, as it is determined by sense; identity of objects comes first [Frege, by Jacquette] |
| 18936 | Frege moved from extensional to intensional semantics when he added the idea of 'sense' [Frege, by Sawyer] |
| 22294 | We can show that a concept is consistent by producing something which falls under it [Frege] |
| 17624 | To understand axioms you must grasp their logical power and priority [Frege, by Burge] |
| 16866 | Tracing inference backwards closes in on a small set of axioms and postulates [Frege] |
| 16868 | The essence of mathematics is the kernel of primitive truths on which it rests [Frege] |
| 16870 | Axioms are truths which cannot be doubted, and for which no proof is needed [Frege] |
| 16871 | A truth can be an axiom in one system and not in another [Frege] |
| 16886 | The truth of an axiom must be independently recognisable [Frege] |
| 6516 | Monty Hall Dilemma: do you abandon your preference after Monty eliminates one of the rivals? [PG] |
| 16869 | To create order in mathematics we need a full system, guided by patterns of inference [Frege] |
| 9886 | Cardinals say how many, and reals give measurements compared to a unit quantity [Frege] |
| 18256 | Quantity is inconceivable without the idea of addition [Frege] |
| 8640 | We cannot define numbers from the idea of a series, because numbers must precede that [Frege] |
| 18252 | Real numbers are ratios of quantities, such as lengths or masses [Frege] |
| 18253 | I wish to go straight from cardinals to reals (as ratios), leaving out the rationals [Frege] |
| 9889 | Real numbers are ratios of quantities [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 9838 | Treating 0 as a number avoids antinomies involving treating 'nobody' as a person [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 9564 | For Frege 'concept' and 'extension' are primitive, but 'zero' and 'successor' are defined [Frege, by Chihara] |
| 10551 | If objects exist because they fall under a concept, 0 is the object under which no objects fall [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 8653 | Nought is the number belonging to the concept 'not identical with itself' [Frege] |
| 8654 | One is the Number which belongs to the concept "identical with 0" [Frege] |
| 8636 | We can say 'a and b are F' if F is 'wise', but not if it is 'one' [Frege] |
| 8641 | You can abstract concepts from the moon, but the number one is not among them [Frege] |
| 9989 | Units can be equal without being identical [Tait on Frege] |
| 17429 | Frege says only concepts which isolate and avoid arbitrary division can give units [Frege, by Koslicki] |
| 17427 | Frege's 'isolation' could be absence of overlap, or drawing conceptual boundaries [Frege, by Koslicki] |
| 17437 | Non-arbitrary division means that what falls under the concept cannot be divided into more of the same [Frege, by Koslicki] |
| 17438 | Our concepts decide what is countable, as in seeing the leaves of the tree, or the foliage [Frege, by Koslicki] |
| 17426 | A concept creating a unit must isolate and unify what falls under it [Frege] |
| 17428 | Frege says counting is determining what number belongs to a given concept [Frege, by Koslicki] |
| 15916 | Frege's one-to-one correspondence replaces well-ordering, because infinities can't be counted [Frege, by Lavine] |
| 17446 | Counting rests on one-one correspondence, of numerals to objects [Frege] |
| 9582 | Husserl rests sameness of number on one-one correlation, forgetting the correlation with numbers themselves [Frege] |
| 10034 | The number of natural numbers is not a natural number [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
| 18271 | We can't prove everything, but we can spell out the unproved, so that foundations are clear [Frege] |
| 16883 | Arithmetical statements can't be axioms, because they are provable [Frege, by Burge] |
| 16864 | If principles are provable, they are theorems; if not, they are axioms [Frege] |
| 17855 | It may be possible to define induction in terms of the ancestral relation [Frege, by Wright,C] |
| 10625 | Frege had a motive to treat numbers as objects, but not a justification [Hale/Wright on Frege] |
| 13871 | Frege claims that numbers are objects, as opposed to them being Fregean concepts [Frege, by Wright,C] |
| 13872 | Numbers are second-level, ascribing properties to concepts rather than to objects [Frege, by Wright,C] |
| 9816 | For Frege, successor was a relation, not a function [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 9953 | Numbers are more than just 'second-level concepts', since existence is also one [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
| 9954 | "Number of x's such that ..x.." is a functional expression, yielding a name when completed [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
| 17636 | A cardinal number may be defined as a class of similar classes [Frege, by Russell] |
| 10139 | Frege gives an incoherent account of extensions resulting from abstraction [Fine,K on Frege] |
| 10028 | For Frege the number of F's is a collection of first-level concepts [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
| 10029 | Numbers need to be objects, to define the extension of the concept of each successor to n [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
| 9973 | The number of F's is the extension of the second level concept 'is equipollent with F' [Frege, by Tait] |
| 16500 | Frege showed that numbers attach to concepts, not to objects [Frege, by Wiggins] |
| 9990 | Frege replaced Cantor's sets as the objects of equinumerosity attributions with concepts [Frege, by Tait] |
| 7738 | Zero is defined using 'is not self-identical', and one by using the concept of zero [Frege, by Weiner] |
| 23456 | Frege said logical predication implies classes, which are arithmetical objects [Frege, by Morris,M] |
| 13887 | Frege started with contextual definition, but then switched to explicit extensional definition [Frege, by Wright,C] |
| 13897 | Each number, except 0, is the number of the concept of all of its predecessors [Frege, by Wright,C] |
| 9856 | Frege's account of cardinals fails in modern set theory, so they are now defined differently [Dummett on Frege] |
| 9902 | Frege's incorrect view is that a number is an equivalence class [Benacerraf on Frege] |
| 17814 | The natural number n is the set of n-membered sets [Frege, by Yourgrau] |
| 17819 | A set doesn't have a fixed number, because the elements can be seen in different ways [Yourgrau on Frege] |
| 17460 | A statement of number contains a predication about a concept [Frege] |
| 17820 | If you can subdivide objects many ways for counting, you can do that to set-elements too [Yourgrau on Frege] |
| 16890 | Frege's problem is explaining the particularity of numbers by general laws [Frege, by Burge] |
| 8630 | Individual numbers are best derived from the number one, and increase by one [Frege] |
| 11029 | 'Exactly ten gallons' may not mean ten things instantiate 'gallon' [Rumfitt on Frege] |
| 10013 | Numerical statements have first-order logical form, so must refer to objects [Frege, by Hodes] |
| 18181 | The Number for F is the extension of 'equal to F' (or maybe just F itself) [Frege] |
| 18103 | Numbers are objects because they partake in identity statements [Frege, by Bostock] |
| 9586 | In a number-statement, something is predicated of a concept [Frege] |
| 3331 | If '5' is the set of all sets with five members, that may be circular, and you can know a priori if the set has content [Benardete,JA on Frege] |
| 9949 | There is the concept, the object falling under it, and the extension (a set, which is also an object) [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
| 10623 | Frege defined number in terms of extensions of concepts, but needed Basic Law V to explain extensions [Frege, by Hale/Wright] |
| 9975 | Frege ignored Cantor's warning that a cardinal set is not just a concept-extension [Tait on Frege] |
| 10020 | Frege's biggest error is in not accounting for the senses of number terms [Hodes on Frege] |
| 10553 | A number is a class of classes of the same cardinality [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 9956 | 'The number of Fs' is the extension (a collection of first-level concepts) of the concept 'equinumerous with F' [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
| 13527 | Frege's cardinals (equivalences of one-one correspondences) is not permissible in ZFC [Frege, by Wolf,RS] |
| 22292 | Hume's Principle fails to implicitly define numbers, because of the Julius Caesar [Frege, by Potter] |
| 17442 | Frege thinks number is fundamentally bound up with one-one correspondence [Frege, by Heck] |
| 11030 | The words 'There are exactly Julius Caesar moons of Mars' are gibberish [Rumfitt on Frege] |
| 10030 | 'Julius Caesar' isn't a number because numbers inherit properties of 0 and successor [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
| 8690 | From within logic, how can we tell whether an arbitrary object like Julius Caesar is a number? [Frege, by Friend] |
| 10219 | Frege said 2 is the extension of all pairs (so Julius Caesar isn't 2, because he's not an extension) [Frege, by Shapiro] |
| 13889 | Fregean numbers are numbers, and not 'Caesar', because they correlate 1-1 [Frege, by Wright,C] |
| 18142 | One-one correlations imply normal arithmetic, but don't explain our concept of a number [Frege, by Bostock] |
| 9046 | Our definition will not tell us whether or not Julius Caesar is a number [Frege] |
| 16896 | If numbers can be derived from logic, then set theory is superfluous [Frege, by Burge] |
| 8639 | If numbers are supposed to be patterns, each number can have many patterns [Frege] |
| 13874 | Numbers seem to be objects because they exactly fit the inference patterns for identities [Frege] |
| 13875 | Frege's platonism proposes that objects are what singular terms refer to [Frege, by Wright,C] |
| 7731 | How can numbers be external (one pair of boots is two boots), or subjective (and so relative)? [Frege, by Weiner] |
| 7737 | Identities refer to objects, so numbers must be objects [Frege, by Weiner] |
| 8635 | Numbers are not physical, and not ideas - they are objective and non-sensible [Frege] |
| 8652 | Numbers are objects, because they can take the definite article, and can't be plurals [Frege] |
| 9580 | Our concepts recognise existing relations, they don't change them [Frege] |
| 9589 | Numbers are not real like the sea, but (crucially) they are still objective [Frege] |
| 17816 | Frege's logicism aimed at removing the reliance of arithmetic on intuition [Frege, by Yourgrau] |
| 9831 | Geometry appeals to intuition as the source of its axioms [Frege] |
| 8633 | There is no physical difference between two boots and one pair of boots [Frege] |
| 9577 | The naïve view of number is that it is like a heap of things, or maybe a property of a heap [Frege] |
| 9951 | It appears that numbers are adjectives, but they don't apply to a single object [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
| 9952 | Numerical adjectives are of the same second-level type as the existential quantifier [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
| 11031 | 'Jupiter has many moons' won't read as 'The number of Jupiter's moons equals the number many' [Rumfitt on Frege] |
| 8637 | The number 'one' can't be a property, if any object can be viewed as one or not one [Frege] |
| 9999 | For science, we can translate adjectival numbers into noun form [Frege] |
| 9945 | Logicism shows that no empirical truths are needed to justify arithmetic [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
| 7739 | Arithmetic is analytic [Frege, by Weiner] |
| 16905 | Arithmetic must be based on logic, because of its total generality [Frege, by Jeshion] |
| 8782 | Frege offered a Platonist version of logicism, committed to cardinal and real numbers [Frege, by Hale/Wright] |
| 13608 | Mathematics has no special axioms of its own, but follows from principles of logic (with definitions) [Frege, by Bostock] |
| 5658 | Numbers are definable in terms of mapping items which fall under concepts [Frege, by Scruton] |
| 18166 | The loss of my Rule V seems to make foundations for arithmetic impossible [Frege] |
| 8655 | Arithmetic is analytic and a priori, and thus it is part of logic [Frege] |
| 16880 | Frege aimed to discover the logical foundations which justify arithmetical judgements [Frege, by Burge] |
| 8689 | Eventually Frege tried to found arithmetic in geometry instead of in logic [Frege, by Friend] |
| 18165 | My Basic Law V is a law of pure logic [Frege] |
| 8487 | Arithmetic is a development of logic, so arithmetical symbolism must expand into logical symbolism [Frege] |
| 10607 | Frege's logic has a hierarchy of object, property, property-of-property etc. [Frege, by Smith,P] |
| 10831 | Frege only managed to prove that arithmetic was analytic with a logic that included set-theory [Quine on Frege] |
| 13864 | Frege's platonism and logicism are in conflict, if logic must dictates an infinity of objects [Wright,C on Frege] |
| 10033 | Why should the existence of pure logic entail the existence of objects? [George/Velleman on Frege] |
| 10010 | Frege's belief in logicism and in numerical objects seem uncomfortable together [Hodes on Frege] |
| 9545 | Late in life Frege abandoned logicism, and saw the source of arithmetic as geometrical [Frege, by Chihara] |
| 9631 | Formalism fails to recognise types of symbols, and also meta-games [Frege, by Brown,JR] |
| 9887 | Formalism misunderstands applications, metatheory, and infinity [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 8751 | Only applicability raises arithmetic from a game to a science [Frege] |
| 9875 | Frege was completing Bolzano's work, of expelling intuition from number theory and analysis [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 8642 | Abstraction from things produces concepts, and numbers are in the concepts [Frege] |
| 8621 | Mental states are irrelevant to mathematics, because they are vague and fluctuating [Frege] |
| 11008 | Existence is not a first-order property, but the instantiation of a property [Frege, by Read] |
| 8643 | Affirmation of existence is just denial of zero [Frege] |
| 19470 | Thoughts in the 'third realm' cannot be sensed, and do not need an owner to exist [Frege] |
| 5657 | Frege's logic showed that there is no concept of being [Frege, by Scruton] |
| 8911 | If abstracta are non-mental, quarks are abstracta, and yet chess and God's thoughts are mental [Rosen on Frege] |
| 8634 | The equator is imaginary, but not fictitious; thought is needed to recognise it [Frege] |
| 18899 | Frege takes the existence of horses to be part of their concept [Frege, by Sommers] |
| 18995 | Frege mistakenly takes existence to be a property of concepts, instead of being about things [Frege, by Yablo] |
| 17443 | Many of us find Frege's claim that truths depend on one another an obscure idea [Heck on Frege] |
| 17445 | Parallelism is intuitive, so it is more fundamental than sameness of direction [Frege, by Heck] |
| 10539 | Frege refers to 'concrete' objects, but they are no different in principle from abstract ones [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 9578 | If objects are just presentation, we get increasing abstraction by ignoring their properties [Frege] |
| 19471 | A fact is a thought that is true [Frege] |
| 17431 | Vagueness is incomplete definition [Frege, by Koslicki] |
| 13879 | For Frege, ontological questions are to be settled by reference to syntactic structures [Frege, by Wright,C] |
| 10642 | Second-order quantifiers are committed to concepts, as first-order commits to objects [Frege, by Linnebo] |
| 10032 | 'Ancestral' relations are derived by iterating back from a given relation [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
| 10606 | Frege treats properties as a kind of function, and maybe a property is its characteristic function [Frege, by Smith,P] |
| 4028 | Frege allows either too few properties (as extensions) or too many (as predicates) [Mellor/Oliver on Frege] |
| 10317 | It is unclear whether Frege included qualities among his abstract objects [Frege, by Hale] |
| 10533 | We can't get a semantics from nouns and predicates referring to the same thing [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 8647 | Not all objects are spatial; 4 can still be an object, despite lacking spatial co-ordinates [Frege] |
| 10309 | Frege says singular terms denote objects, numerals are singular terms, so numbers exist [Frege, by Hale] |
| 10550 | Frege establishes abstract objects independently from concrete ones, by falling under a concept [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 18269 | Logical objects are extensions of concepts, or ranges of values of functions [Frege] |
| 8785 | For Frege, objects just are what singular terms refer to [Frege, by Hale/Wright] |
| 10278 | Without concepts we would not have any objects [Frege, by Shapiro] |
| 8489 | The concept 'object' is too simple for analysis; unlike a function, it is an expression with no empty place [Frege] |
| 10535 | Frege's 'objects' are both the referents of proper names, and what predicates are true or false of [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 9877 | Late Frege saw his non-actual objective objects as exclusively thoughts and senses [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 17432 | Frege's universe comes already divided into objects [Frege, by Koslicki] |
| 9891 | The first demand of logic is of a sharp boundary [Frege] |
| 9388 | Every concept must have a sharp boundary; we cannot allow an indeterminate third case [Frege] |
| 16022 | The idea of a criterion of identity was introduced by Frege [Frege, by Noonan] |
| 11100 | Frege's algorithm of identity is the law of putting equals for equals [Frege, by Quine] |
| 4893 | Frege was asking how identities could be informative [Frege, by Perry] |
| 12153 | Geach denies Frege's view, that 'being the same F' splits into being the same and being F [Perry on Frege] |
| 3318 | Frege made identity a logical notion, enshrined above all in the formula 'for all x, x=x' [Frege, by Benardete,JA] |
| 9853 | Identity between objects is not a consequence of identity, but part of what 'identity' means [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 24054 | Everything has a probability, something will happen, and probabilities add up [PG] |
| 16885 | To understand a thought, understand its inferential connections to other thoughts [Frege, by Burge] |
| 17623 | To understand a thought you must understand its logical structure [Frege, by Burge] |
| 3875 | If reality is just what we perceive, we would have no need for a sixth sense [PG] |
| 9158 | For Frege a priori knowledge derives from general principles, so numbers can't be primitive [Frege] |
| 16887 | Frege's concept of 'self-evident' makes no reference to minds [Frege, by Burge] |
| 8657 | Mathematicians just accept self-evidence, whether it is logical or intuitive [Frege] |
| 16894 | An apriori truth is grounded in generality, which is universal quantification [Frege, by Burge] |
| 9352 | An a priori truth is one derived from general laws which do not require proof [Frege] |
| 16889 | A truth is a priori if it can be proved entirely from general unproven laws [Frege] |
| 3876 | If my team is losing 3-1, I have synthetic a priori knowledge that they need two goals for a draw [PG] |
| 2514 | Frege tried to explain synthetic a priori truths by expanding the concept of analyticity [Frege, by Katz] |
| 5729 | If the senses are deceptive, reason, which rests on them, is even worse [Lucretius] |
| 5702 | The senses are much the best way to distinguish true from false [Lucretius] |
| 16900 | Intuitions cannot be communicated [Frege, by Burge] |
| 5697 | The only possible standard for settling doubts is the foundation of the senses [Lucretius] |
| 16903 | Justifications show the ordering of truths, and the foundation is what is self-evident [Frege, by Jeshion] |
| 11052 | Psychological logic can't distinguish justification from causes of a belief [Frege] |
| 5727 | Most supposed delusions of the senses are really misinterpretations by the mind [Lucretius] |
| 16882 | The building blocks contain the whole contents of a discipline [Frege] |
| 5714 | Even simple facts are hard to believe at first hearing [Lucretius] |
| 8624 | Induction is merely psychological, with a principle that it can actually establish laws [Frege] |
| 8626 | In science one observation can create high probability, while a thousand might prove nothing [Frege] |
| 8648 | Ideas are not spatial, and don't have distances between them [Frege] |
| 5718 | The mind is in the middle of the breast, because there we experience fear and joy [Lucretius] |
| 5717 | The mind is a part of a man, just like a hand or an eye [Lucretius] |
| 21387 | The separate elements and capacities of a mind cannot be distinguished [Lucretius] |
| 5709 | The actions of the mind are not determinate and passive, because atoms can swerve [Lucretius] |
| 5695 | Only bodies can touch one another [Lucretius] |
| 5711 | The earth is and always has been an insentient being [Lucretius] |
| 5712 | Particles may have sensation, but eggs turning into chicks suggests otherwise [Lucretius] |
| 5719 | The mind moves limbs, wakes the body up, changes facial expressions, which involve touch [Lucretius] |
| 5724 | Lions, foxes and deer have distinct characters because their minds share in their bodies [Lucretius] |
| 5713 | You needn't be made of laughing particles to laugh, so why not sensation from senseless seeds? [Lucretius] |
| 7734 | Maybe a mollusc's brain events for pain ARE of the same type (broadly) as a human's [PG] |
| 7735 | Maybe a frog's brain events for fear are functionally like ours, but not phenomenally [PG] |
| 8620 | Thought is the same everywhere, and the laws of thought do not vary [Frege] |
| 9581 | Many people have the same thought, which is the component, not the private presentation [Frege] |
| 19469 | We grasp thoughts (thinking), decide they are true (judgement), and manifest the judgement (assertion) [Frege] |
| 8162 | Thoughts have their own realm of reality - 'sense' (as opposed to the realm of 'reference') [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 9818 | A thought is distinguished from other things by a capacity to be true or false [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 18265 | We don't judge by combining subject and concept; we get a concept by splitting up a judgement [Frege] |
| 16379 | Thoughts about myself are understood one way to me, and another when communicated [Frege] |
| 16876 | We need definitions to cram retrievable sense into a signed receptacle [Frege] |
| 16875 | We use signs to mark receptacles for complex senses [Frege] |
| 9870 | Early Frege takes the extensions of concepts for granted [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 13878 | Concepts are, precisely, the references of predicates [Frege, by Wright,C] |
| 7736 | A concept is a non-psychological one-place function asserting something of an object [Frege, by Weiner] |
| 17430 | Fregean concepts have precise boundaries and universal applicability [Frege, by Koslicki] |
| 8622 | Psychological accounts of concepts are subjective, and ultimately destroy truth [Frege] |
| 9947 | Concepts are the ontological counterparts of predicative expressions [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
| 10319 | An assertion about the concept 'horse' must indirectly speak of an object [Frege, by Hale] |
| 8488 | A concept is a function whose value is always a truth-value [Frege] |
| 18752 | 'The concept "horse"' denotes a concept, yet seems also to denote an object [Frege, by McGee] |
| 9839 | Frege equated the concepts under which an object falls with its properties [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 9190 | A concept is a function mapping objects onto truth-values, if they fall under the concept [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 13665 | Frege took the study of concepts to be part of logic [Frege, by Shapiro] |
| 9948 | Unlike objects, concepts are inherently incomplete [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
| 8651 | A concept is a possible predicate of a singular judgement [Frege] |
| 4973 | As I understand it, a concept is the meaning of a grammatical predicate [Frege] |
| 9846 | Defining 'direction' by parallelism doesn't tell you whether direction is a line [Dummett on Frege] |
| 9976 | Frege accepts abstraction to the concept of all sets equipollent to a given one [Tait on Frege] |
| 9988 | If we abstract 'from' two cats, the units are not black or white, or cats [Tait on Frege] |
| 9579 | Disregarding properties of two cats still leaves different objects, but what is now the difference? [Frege] |
| 9587 | How do you find the right level of inattention; you eliminate too many or too few characteristics [Frege] |
| 9890 | The modern account of real numbers detaches a ratio from its geometrical origins [Frege] |
| 10803 | Frege himself abstracts away from tone and color [Yablo on Frege] |
| 9855 | Frege's logical abstaction identifies a common feature as the maximal set of equivalent objects [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 10802 | Frege's 'parallel' and 'direction' don't have the same content, as we grasp 'parallel' first [Yablo on Frege] |
| 10526 | Fregean abstraction creates concepts which are equivalences between initial items [Frege, by Fine,K] |
| 10525 | Frege put the idea of abstraction on a rigorous footing [Frege, by Fine,K] |
| 10556 | We create new abstract concepts by carving up the content in a different way [Frege] |
| 9882 | You can't simultaneously fix the truth-conditions of a sentence and the domain of its variables [Dummett on Frege] |
| 9881 | From basing 'parallel' on identity of direction, Frege got all abstractions from identity statements [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 5816 | Frege said concepts were abstract entities, not mental entities [Frege, by Putnam] |
| 9588 | Number-abstraction somehow makes things identical without changing them! [Frege] |
| 11846 | If we abstract the difference between two houses, they don't become the same house [Frege] |
| 9167 | Frege felt that meanings must be public, so they are abstractions rather than mental entities [Frege, by Putnam] |
| 9583 | Psychological logicians are concerned with sense of words, but mathematicians study the reference [Frege] |
| 9584 | Identity baffles psychologists, since A and B must be presented differently to identify them [Frege] |
| 22318 | Frege failed to show when two sets of truth-conditions are equivalent [Frege, by Potter] |
| 7307 | A thought is not psychological, but a condition of the world that makes a sentence true [Frege, by Miller,A] |
| 4980 | The meaning (reference) of a sentence is its truth value - the circumstance of it being true or false [Frege] |
| 16879 | A sign won't gain sense just from being used in sentences with familiar components [Frege] |
| 8646 | Words in isolation seem to have ideas as meanings, but words have meaning in propositions [Frege] |
| 7732 | Never ask for the meaning of a word in isolation, but only in the context of a proposition [Frege] |
| 8446 | We understand new propositions by constructing their sense from the words [Frege] |
| 9180 | Holism says all language use is also a change in the rules of language [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 4981 | The reference of a word should be understood as part of the reference of the sentence [Frege] |
| 15597 | Frege's Puzzle: from different semantics we infer different reference for two names with the same reference [Frege, by Fine,K] |
| 17002 | Frege's 'sense' is ambiguous, between the meaning of a designator, and how it fixes reference [Kripke on Frege] |
| 18778 | Every descriptive name has a sense, but may not have a reference [Frege] |
| 7805 | Frege started as anti-realist, but the sense/reference distinction led him to realism [Frege, by Benardete,JA] |
| 4976 | The meaning (reference) of 'evening star' is the same as that of 'morning star', but not the sense [Frege] |
| 4977 | In maths, there are phrases with a clear sense, but no actual reference [Frege] |
| 4979 | We are driven from sense to reference by our desire for truth [Frege] |
| 8449 | Senses can't be subjective, because propositions would be private, and disagreement impossible [Frege] |
| 15155 | Expressions always give ways of thinking of referents, rather than the referents themselves [Frege, by Soames] |
| 4972 | I may regard a thought about Phosphorus as true, and the same thought about Hesperus as false [Frege] |
| 22280 | Frege's account was top-down and decompositional, not bottom-up and compositional [Frege, by Potter] |
| 7309 | Frege's 'sense' is the strict and literal meaning, stripped of tone [Frege, by Miller,A] |
| 7312 | 'Sense' solves the problems of bearerless names, substitution in beliefs, and informativeness [Frege, by Miller,A] |
| 11126 | 'Sense' gives meaning to non-referring names, and to two expressions for one referent [Frege, by Margolis/Laurence] |
| 8164 | Frege was the first to construct a plausible theory of meaning [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 9817 | Earlier Frege focuses on content itself; later he became interested in understanding content [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 8171 | Frege divided the meaning of a sentence into sense, force and tone [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 4954 | Frege uses 'sense' to mean both a designator's meaning, and the way its reference is determined [Kripke on Frege] |
| 7304 | Frege explained meaning as sense, semantic value, reference, force and tone [Frege, by Miller,A] |
| 4974 | For all the multiplicity of languages, mankind has a common stock of thoughts [Frege] |
| 16873 | Thoughts are not subjective or psychological, because some thoughts are the same for us all [Frege] |
| 16872 | A thought is the sense expressed by a sentence, and is what we prove [Frege] |
| 19467 | A 'thought' is something for which the question of truth can arise; thoughts are senses of sentences [Frege] |
| 19472 | A sentence is only a thought if it is complete, and has a time-specification [Frege] |
| 16874 | The parts of a thought map onto the parts of a sentence [Frege] |
| 9370 | A statement is analytic if substitution of synonyms can make it a logical truth [Frege, by Boghossian] |
| 8743 | Frege considered analyticity to be an epistemic concept [Frege, by Shapiro] |
| 7725 | 'P or not-p' seems to be analytic, but does not fit Kant's account, lacking clear subject or predicate [Frege, by Weiner] |
| 20295 | All analytic truths can become logical truths, by substituting definitions or synonyms [Frege, by Rey] |
| 7316 | Analytic truths are those that can be demonstrated using only logic and definitions [Frege, by Miller,A] |
| 2515 | Frege fails to give a concept of analyticity, so he fails to explain synthetic a priori truth that way [Katz on Frege] |
| 6611 | One man's meat is another man's poison [Lucretius] |
| 5730 | Our bodies weren't created to be used; on the contrary, their creation makes a use possible [Lucretius] |
| 5726 | The dead are no different from those who were never born [Lucretius] |
| 5705 | Nature only wants two things: freedom from pain, and pleasure [Lucretius] |
| 3877 | Utilitarianism seems to justify the discreet murder of unhappy people [PG] |
| 8619 | To learn something, you must know that you don't know [Frege] |
| 5716 | Nature runs the universe by herself without the aid of gods [Lucretius] |
| 5704 | There can be no centre in infinity [Lucretius] |
| 5703 | The universe must be limitless, since there could be nothing outside to limit it [Lucretius] |
| 5693 | Everything is created and fed by nature from atoms, and they return to atoms in death [Lucretius] |
| 5701 | If an object is infinitely subdivisible, it will be the same as the whole universe [Lucretius] |
| 5708 | In downward motion, atoms occasionally swerve slightly for no reason [Lucretius] |
| 8656 | The laws of number are not laws of nature, but are laws of the laws of nature [Frege] |
| 17004 | Nothing can break the binding laws of eternity [Lucretius] |
| 5706 | Atoms move themselves [Lucretius] |
| 5696 | If there were no space there could be no movement, or even creation [Lucretius] |
| 5700 | It is quicker to break things up than to assemble them [Lucretius] |
| 5698 | We can only sense time by means of movement, or its absence [Lucretius] |
| 5715 | This earth is very unlikely to be the only one created [Lucretius] |
| 5694 | Nothing can be created by divine power out of nothing [Lucretius] |
| 6126 | Life is Movement, Respiration, Sensation, Nutrition, Excretion, Reproduction, Growth (MRS NERG) [PG] |
| 3874 | How could God know there wasn't an unknown force controlling his 'free' will? [PG] |
| 3873 | An omniscient being couldn't know it was omniscient, as that requires information from beyond its scope of knowledge [PG] |
| 3307 | Frege put forward an ontological argument for the existence of numbers [Frege, by Benardete,JA] |
| 7741 | The predicate 'exists' is actually a natural language expression for a quantifier [Frege, by Weiner] |
| 22286 | Existence is not a first-level concept (of God), but a second-level property of concepts [Frege, by Potter] |
| 8644 | Because existence is a property of concepts the ontological argument for God fails [Frege] |
| 8491 | The Ontological Argument fallaciously treats existence as a first-level concept [Frege] |
| 5699 | If matter wasn't everlasting, everything would have disappeared by now [Lucretius] |
| 5707 | The universe can't have been created by gods, because it is too imperfect [Lucretius] |
| 5710 | Gods are tranquil and aloof, and have no need of or interest in us [Lucretius] |
| 5731 | Why does Jupiter never hurl lightning from a blue sky? [Lucretius] |
| 5720 | Spirit is mortal [Lucretius] |
| 5722 | For a separated spirit to remain sentient it would need sense organs attached to it [Lucretius] |
| 5725 | An immortal mind couldn't work harmoniously with a mortal body [Lucretius] |
| 5721 | The mind is very small smooth particles, which evaporate at death [Lucretius] |
| 5723 | If spirit is immortal and enters us at birth, why don't we remember a previous existence? [Lucretius] |