Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Lucretius, Porphyry and Rowland Stout

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98 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / b. Philosophy as transcendent
Philosophy has its own mode of death, by separating soul from body [Porphyry]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
The concept of truth was originated by the senses [Lucretius]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
The presence of the incorporeal is only known by certain kinds of disposition [Porphyry]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
Are genera and species real or conceptual? bodies or incorporeal? in sensibles or separate from them? [Porphyry]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
Diversity arises from the power of unity [Porphyry]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 4. Pro-Empiricism
The senses are much the best way to distinguish true from false [Lucretius]
If the senses are deceptive, reason, which rests on them, is even worse [Lucretius]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
Memory is not conserved images, but reproduction of previous thought [Porphyry]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / c. Empirical foundations
The only possible standard for settling doubts is the foundation of the senses [Lucretius]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 3. Illusion Scepticism
Most supposed delusions of the senses are really misinterpretations by the mind [Lucretius]
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
Even simple facts are hard to believe at first hearing [Lucretius]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
Evolutionary explanations look to the past or the group, not to the individual [Stout,R]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
Not all explanation is causal. We don't explain a painting's beauty, or the irrationality of root-2, that way [Stout,R]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / c. Features of mind
Intelligence is aware of itself, so the intelligence is both the thinker and the thought [Porphyry]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / d. Location of mind
The mind is in the middle of the breast, because there we experience fear and joy [Lucretius]
The mind is a part of a man, just like a hand or an eye [Lucretius]
The soul is everywhere and nowhere in the body, and must be its cause [Porphyry]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 5. Unity of Mind
The separate elements and capacities of a mind cannot be distinguished [Lucretius]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
Successful introspection reveals the substrate along with the object of thought [Porphyry]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 2. Sources of Free Will
The actions of the mind are not determinate and passive, because atoms can swerve [Lucretius]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 1. Dualism
The soul is bound to matter by the force of its own disposition [Porphyry]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 2. Interactionism
Only bodies can touch one another [Lucretius]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 3. Panpsychism
The earth is and always has been an insentient being [Lucretius]
Particles may have sensation, but eggs turning into chicks suggests otherwise [Lucretius]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
The mind moves limbs, wakes the body up, changes facial expressions, which involve touch [Lucretius]
Lions, foxes and deer have distinct characters because their minds share in their bodies [Lucretius]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
You needn't be made of laughing particles to laugh, so why not sensation from senseless seeds? [Lucretius]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 1. Action Theory
Philosophy of action studies the nature of agency, and of deliberate actions [Stout,R]
Agency is causal processes that are sensitive to justification [Stout,R]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 2. Duration of an Action
Mental states and actions need to be separate, if one is to cause the other [Stout,R]
Are actions bodily movements, or a sequence of intention-movement-result? [Stout,R]
If one action leads to another, does it cause it, or is it part of it? [Stout,R]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 3. Actions and Events
I do actions, but not events, so actions are not events [Stout,R]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 4. Action as Movement
Bicycle riding is not just bodily movement - you also have to be on the bicycle [Stout,R]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions
The rationalistic approach says actions are intentional when subject to justification [Stout,R]
The causal theory says that actions are intentional when intention (or belief-desire) causes the act [Stout,R]
Deciding what to do usually involves consulting the world, not our own minds [Stout,R]
Should we study intentions in their own right, or only as part of intentional action? [Stout,R]
You can have incompatible desires, but your intentions really ought to be consistent [Stout,R]
The normativity of intentions would be obvious if they were internal promises [Stout,R]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / b. Types of intention
Intentional agency is seen in internal precursors of action, and in external reasons for the act [Stout,R]
Speech needs sustained intentions, but not prior intentions [Stout,R]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / d. Group intentions
Bratman has to treat shared intentions as interrelated individual intentions [Stout,R]
A request to pass the salt shares an intention that the request be passed on [Stout,R]
An individual cannot express the intention that a group do something like moving a piano [Stout,R]
An intention is a goal to which behaviour is adapted, for an individual or for a group [Stout,R]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / b. Volitionism
If the action of walking is just an act of will, then movement of the legs seems irrelevant [Stout,R]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / c. Agent causation
Most philosophers see causation as by an event or state in the agent, rather than the whole agent [Stout,R]
If you don't mention an agent, you aren't talking about action [Stout,R]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will
If you can judge one act as best, then do another, this supports an inward-looking view of agency [Stout,R]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 1. Acting on Desires
For an ascetic a powerful desire for something is a reason not to implement it [Stout,R]
Maybe your emotions arise from you motivations, rather than being their cause [Stout,R]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
Beliefs, desires and intentions are not events, so can't figure in causal relations [Stout,R]
A standard view says that the explanation of an action is showing its rational justification [Stout,R]
In order to be causal, an agent's reasons must be internalised as psychological states [Stout,R]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
An action is only yours if you produce it, rather than some state or event within you [Stout,R]
There may be a justification relative to a person's view, and yet no absolute justification [Stout,R]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / b. Double Effect
Describing a death as a side-effect rather than a goal may just be good public relations [Stout,R]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 5. Objectivism in Art
One man's meat is another man's poison [Lucretius]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Our bodies weren't created to be used; on the contrary, their creation makes a use possible [Lucretius]
Justice is each person fulfilling his function [Porphyry]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
The dead are no different from those who were never born [Lucretius]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
We should avoid the pleasures of love, or at least, should not enact our dreams [Porphyry]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / e. Role of pleasure
Nature only wants two things: freedom from pain, and pleasure [Lucretius]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
Civil virtues make us behave benevolently, and thereby unite citizens [Porphyry]
Civil virtues control the passions, and make us conform to our nature [Porphyry]
Purificatory virtues detach the soul completely from the passions [Porphyry]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
There are practical, purificatory, contemplative, and exemplary virtues [Porphyry]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
Nature runs the universe by herself without the aid of gods [Lucretius]
Unified real existence is neither great nor small, though greatness and smallness participate in it [Porphyry]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 5. Infinite in Nature
There can be no centre in infinity [Lucretius]
The universe must be limitless, since there could be nothing outside to limit it [Lucretius]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / g. Atomism
Everything is created and fed by nature from atoms, and they return to atoms in death [Lucretius]
If an object is infinitely subdivisible, it will be the same as the whole universe [Lucretius]
In downward motion, atoms occasionally swerve slightly for no reason [Lucretius]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
Aristotelian causation involves potentiality inputs into processes (rather than a pair of events) [Stout,R]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 7. Strictness of Laws
Nothing can break the binding laws of eternity [Lucretius]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / a. Explaining movement
Atoms move themselves [Lucretius]
If there were no space there could be no movement, or even creation [Lucretius]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 2. Thermodynamics / d. Entropy
It is quicker to break things up than to assemble them [Lucretius]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / c. Idealist time
Time is the circular movement of the soul [Porphyry]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / e. Eventless time
Some think time is seen at rest, as well as in movement [Porphyry]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / a. Experience of time
We can only sense time by means of movement, or its absence [Lucretius]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 1. Cosmology
This earth is very unlikely to be the only one created [Lucretius]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 2. Eternal Universe
Nothing can be created by divine power out of nothing [Lucretius]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
God is nowhere, and hence everywhere [Porphyry]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / a. Cosmological Proof
If matter wasn't everlasting, everything would have disappeared by now [Lucretius]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / c. Teleological Proof critique
The universe can't have been created by gods, because it is too imperfect [Lucretius]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 2. Pantheism
Everything existing proceeds from divinity, and is within divinity [Porphyry]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 3. Deism
Gods are tranquil and aloof, and have no need of or interest in us [Lucretius]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
Why does Jupiter never hurl lightning from a blue sky? [Lucretius]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / a. Immortality
Spirit is mortal [Lucretius]
For a separated spirit to remain sentient it would need sense organs attached to it [Lucretius]
An immortal mind couldn't work harmoniously with a mortal body [Lucretius]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / b. Soul
The mind is very small smooth particles, which evaporate at death [Lucretius]
If spirit is immortal and enters us at birth, why don't we remember a previous existence? [Lucretius]
Nature binds or detaches body to soul, but soul itself joins and detaches soul from body [Porphyry]
Individual souls are all connected, though distinct, and without dividing universal Soul [Porphyry]