Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Luitzen E.J. Brouwer, Anand Vaidya and Quassim Cassam

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25 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
19259 If 2-D conceivability can a priori show possibilities, this is a defence of conceptual analysis [Vaidya]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 7. Paraconsistency
12452 Our dislike of contradiction in logic is a matter of psychology, not mathematics [Brouwer]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
15941 For intuitionists excluded middle is an outdated historical convention [Brouwer]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 1. Mathematics
18119 Mathematics is a mental activity which does not use language [Brouwer, by Bostock]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / h. Reals from Cauchy
18247 Brouwer saw reals as potential, not actual, and produced by a rule, or a choice [Brouwer, by Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / g. Applying mathematics
18118 Brouwer regards the application of mathematics to the world as somehow 'wicked' [Brouwer, by Bostock]
12451 Scientific laws largely rest on the results of counting and measuring [Brouwer]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / b. Intuitionism
12454 Intuitionists only accept denumerable sets [Brouwer]
12453 Neo-intuitionism abstracts from the reuniting of moments, to intuit bare two-oneness [Brouwer]
8728 Intuitionist mathematics deduces by introspective construction, and rejects unknown truths [Brouwer]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / c. Essentials are necessary
19262 Essential properties are necessary, but necessary properties may not be essential [Vaidya]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
19267 Define conceivable; how reliable is it; does inconceivability help; and what type of possibility results? [Vaidya]
19440 How do you know you have conceived a thing deeply enough to assess its possibility? [Vaidya]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / c. Possible but inconceivable
19268 Inconceivability (implying impossibility) may be failure to conceive, or incoherence [Vaidya]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
19265 Can you possess objective understanding without realising it? [Vaidya]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / b. Gettier problem
19260 Gettier deductive justifications split the justification from the truthmaker [Vaidya]
19266 In a disjunctive case, the justification comes from one side, and the truth from the other [Vaidya]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 7. Self and Body / a. Self needs body
5673 If we have a pain, we are strongly aware of the bodily self [Cassam]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 1. Introspection
5670 Knowledge of thoughts covers both their existence and their contents [Cassam]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
5671 Outer senses are as important as introspection in the acquisition of self-knowledge [Cassam]
5672 Is there a mode of self-awareness that isn't perception, and could it give self-knowledge? [Cassam]
5675 Neither self-consciousness nor self-reference require self-knowledge [Cassam]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
5674 We can't introspect ourselves as objects, because that would involve possible error [Cassam]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
19264 Aboutness is always intended, and cannot be accidental [Vaidya]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
10117 Intuitonists in mathematics worried about unjustified assertion, as well as contradiction [Brouwer, by George/Velleman]