Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Luitzen E.J. Brouwer, C.D. Broad and James Woodward

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18 ideas

4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 7. Paraconsistency
12452 Our dislike of contradiction in logic is a matter of psychology, not mathematics [Brouwer]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
15941 For intuitionists excluded middle is an outdated historical convention [Brouwer]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 1. Mathematics
18119 Mathematics is a mental activity which does not use language [Brouwer, by Bostock]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / h. Reals from Cauchy
18247 Brouwer saw reals as potential, not actual, and produced by a rule, or a choice [Brouwer, by Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / g. Applying mathematics
12451 Scientific laws largely rest on the results of counting and measuring [Brouwer]
18118 Brouwer regards the application of mathematics to the world as somehow 'wicked' [Brouwer, by Bostock]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / b. Intuitionism
12454 Intuitionists only accept denumerable sets [Brouwer]
12453 Neo-intuitionism abstracts from the reuniting of moments, to intuit bare two-oneness [Brouwer]
8728 Intuitionist mathematics deduces by introspective construction, and rejects unknown truths [Brouwer]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 4. Four-Dimensionalism
14759 A thing is simply a long event, linked by qualities, and spatio-temporal unity [Broad]
11842 If short-lived happenings like car crashes are 'events', why not long-lived events like Dover Cliffs? [Broad]
14963 Surely the past phases of a thing are not parts of the thing? [Broad]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
7628 Broad rejects the inferential component of the representative theory [Broad, by Maund]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
14367 An explanation is a causal graph [Woodward,J, by Strevens]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
10117 Intuitonists in mathematics worried about unjustified assertion, as well as contradiction [Brouwer, by George/Velleman]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / g. Growing block
8160 The present and past exist, but the future does not [Broad, by Dummett]
14609 We could say present and past exist, but not future, so that each event adds to the total history [Broad]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / d. Time series
22933 We imagine the present as a spotlight, moving across events from past to future [Broad]