Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Luitzen E.J. Brouwer, Charles Parsons and Rudolph Carnap

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these philosophers


38 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 2. Possibility of Metaphysics
No possible evidence could decide the reality of numbers, so it is a pseudo-question [Carnap]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 7. Against Metaphysics
Metaphysics uses empty words, or just produces pseudo-statements [Carnap]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 4. Alethic Modal Logic
Modal logic is not an extensional language [Parsons,C]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 7. Paraconsistency
Our dislike of contradiction in logic is a matter of psychology, not mathematics [Brouwer]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / j. Axiom of Choice IX
The old problems with the axiom of choice are probably better ascribed to the law of excluded middle [Parsons,C]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence
Carnap defined consequence by contradiction, but this is unintuitive and changes with substitution [Tarski on Carnap]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 4. Logic by Convention
Each person is free to build their own logic, just by specifying a syntax [Carnap]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
For intuitionists excluded middle is an outdated historical convention [Brouwer]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification
Substitutional existential quantifier may explain the existence of linguistic entities [Parsons,C]
On the substitutional interpretation, '(∃x) Fx' is true iff a closed term 't' makes Ft true [Parsons,C]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 1. Mathematics
Mathematics is a mental activity which does not use language [Brouwer, by Bostock]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / h. Reals from Cauchy
Brouwer saw reals as potential, not actual, and produced by a rule, or a choice [Brouwer, by Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
Parsons says counting is tagging as first, second, third..., and converting the last to a cardinal [Parsons,C, by Heck]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / g. Applying mathematics
Brouwer regards the application of mathematics to the world as somehow 'wicked' [Brouwer, by Bostock]
Scientific laws largely rest on the results of counting and measuring [Brouwer]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / c. Against mathematical empiricism
General principles can be obvious in mathematics, but bold speculations in empirical science [Parsons,C]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
Questions about numbers are answered by analysis, and are analytic, and hence logically true [Carnap]
Logical positivists incorporated geometry into logicism, saying axioms are just definitions [Carnap, by Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 8. Finitism
If functions are transfinite objects, finitists can have no conception of them [Parsons,C]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / b. Intuitionism
Intuitionists only accept denumerable sets [Brouwer]
Neo-intuitionism abstracts from the reuniting of moments, to intuit bare two-oneness [Brouwer]
Intuitionist mathematics deduces by introspective construction, and rejects unknown truths [Brouwer]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 4. Abstract Existence
Internal questions about abstractions are trivial, and external ones deeply problematic [Carnap, by Szabó]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 1. Ontologies
Existence questions are 'internal' (within a framework) or 'external' (concerning the whole framework) [Carnap]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
To be 'real' is to be an element of a system, so we cannot ask reality questions about the system itself [Carnap]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
A linguistic framework involves commitment to entities, so only commitment to the framework is in question [Carnap]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems
If a mathematical structure is rejected from a physical theory, it retains its mathematical status [Parsons,C]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 6. Nihilism about Objects
We only accept 'things' within a language with formation, testing and acceptance rules [Carnap]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals
In the truth-functional account a burnt-up match was soluble because it never entered water [Carnap]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
Empiricists tend to reject abstract entities, and to feel sympathy with nominalism [Carnap]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 3. Pragmatism
New linguistic claims about entities are not true or false, but just expedient, fruitful or successful [Carnap]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
Carnap tried to define all scientific predicates in terms of primitive relations, using type theory [Carnap, by Button]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 3. Instrumentalism
All linguistic forms in science are merely judged by their efficiency as instruments [Carnap]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation
Good explications are exact, fruitful, simple and similar to the explicandum [Carnap, by Salmon]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / g. Conceptual atomism
All concepts can be derived from a few basics, making possible one science of everything [Carnap, by Brody]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
Intuitonists in mathematics worried about unjustified assertion, as well as contradiction [Brouwer, by George/Velleman]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 8. Possible Worlds Semantics
The intension of a sentence is the set of all possible worlds in which it is true [Carnap, by Kaplan]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / a. Translation
All translation loses some content (but language does not create reality) [Carnap]