Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Luitzen E.J. Brouwer, Demetris Portides and Robert van Gulick

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25 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
9327 Organisms understand their worlds better if they understand themselves [Gulick]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 7. Paraconsistency
12452 Our dislike of contradiction in logic is a matter of psychology, not mathematics [Brouwer]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
15941 For intuitionists excluded middle is an outdated historical convention [Brouwer]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 1. Mathematics
18119 Mathematics is a mental activity which does not use language [Brouwer, by Bostock]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / h. Reals from Cauchy
18247 Brouwer saw reals as potential, not actual, and produced by a rule, or a choice [Brouwer, by Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / g. Applying mathematics
12451 Scientific laws largely rest on the results of counting and measuring [Brouwer]
18118 Brouwer regards the application of mathematics to the world as somehow 'wicked' [Brouwer, by Bostock]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / b. Intuitionism
12454 Intuitionists only accept denumerable sets [Brouwer]
12453 Neo-intuitionism abstracts from the reuniting of moments, to intuit bare two-oneness [Brouwer]
8728 Intuitionist mathematics deduces by introspective construction, and rejects unknown truths [Brouwer]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
9325 In contrast with knowledge, the notion of understanding emphasizes practical engagement [Gulick]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 6. Knowing How
9326 Knowing-that is a much richer kind of knowing-how [Gulick]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 7. Scientific Models
17499 Theoretical models can represent, by mapping onto the data-models [Portides]
17498 In the 'received view' models are formal; the 'semantic view' emphasises representation [Portides, by PG]
17501 Representational success in models depends on success of their explanations [Portides]
17502 The best model of the atomic nucleus is the one which explains the most results [Portides]
17496 'Model' belongs in a family of concepts, with representation, idealisation and abstraction [Portides]
17497 Models are theory-driven, or phenomenological (more empirical and specific) [Portides]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / i. Explanations by mechanism
17500 General theories may be too abstract to actually explain the mechanisms [Portides]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / b. Essence of consciousness
9319 Is consciousness a type of self-awareness, or is being self-aware a way of being conscious? [Gulick]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / f. Higher-order thought
9320 Higher-order theories divide over whether the higher level involves thought or perception [Gulick]
9321 Higher-order models reduce the problem of consciousness to intentionality [Gulick]
9322 Maybe qualia only exist at the lower level, and a higher-level is needed for what-it-is-like [Gulick]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
10117 Intuitonists in mathematics worried about unjustified assertion, as well as contradiction [Brouwer, by George/Velleman]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 2. Life
9324 From the teleopragmatic perspective, life is largely an informational process [Gulick]