17 ideas
| 5435 | An interpreter of a text, because of wider knowledge, can understand it better than its author [Schleiermacher, by Mautner] |
| 22028 | Unity emerges from understanding particulars, so understanding is prior to seeing unity [Schleiermacher] |
| 18009 | Chomsky established the view that category mistakes are well-formed but meaningless [Chomsky, by Magidor] |
| 12452 | Our dislike of contradiction in logic is a matter of psychology, not mathematics [Brouwer] |
| 15941 | For intuitionists excluded middle is an outdated historical convention [Brouwer] |
| 18119 | Mathematics is a mental activity which does not use language [Brouwer, by Bostock] |
| 18247 | Brouwer saw reals as potential, not actual, and produced by a rule, or a choice [Brouwer, by Shapiro] |
| 12451 | Scientific laws largely rest on the results of counting and measuring [Brouwer] |
| 18118 | Brouwer regards the application of mathematics to the world as somehow 'wicked' [Brouwer, by Bostock] |
| 12454 | Intuitionists only accept denumerable sets [Brouwer] |
| 12453 | Neo-intuitionism abstracts from the reuniting of moments, to intuit bare two-oneness [Brouwer] |
| 8728 | Intuitionist mathematics deduces by introspective construction, and rejects unknown truths [Brouwer] |
| 6649 | Chomsky now says concepts are basically innate, as well as syntax [Chomsky, by Lowe] |
| 10117 | Intuitonists in mathematics worried about unjustified assertion, as well as contradiction [Brouwer, by George/Velleman] |
| 18007 | Syntax is independent of semantics; sentences can be well formed but meaningless [Chomsky, by Magidor] |
| 18006 | Chomsky's 'interpretative semantics' says syntax comes first, and is then interpreted [Chomsky, by Magidor] |
| 20959 | Concepts are only analytic once the predicate is absorbed into the subject [Schleiermacher] |