29 ideas
10017 | Truth in a model is more tractable than the general notion of truth [Hodes] |
10018 | Truth is quite different in interpreted set theory and in the skeleton of its language [Hodes] |
12452 | Our dislike of contradiction in logic is a matter of psychology, not mathematics [Brouwer] |
10015 | Higher-order logic may be unintelligible, but it isn't set theory [Hodes] |
15941 | For intuitionists excluded middle is an outdated historical convention [Brouwer] |
10011 | Identity is a level one relation with a second-order definition [Hodes] |
10016 | When an 'interpretation' creates a model based on truth, this doesn't include Fregean 'sense' [Hodes] |
18119 | Mathematics is a mental activity which does not use language [Brouwer, by Bostock] |
10027 | Mathematics is higher-order modal logic [Hodes] |
18247 | Brouwer saw reals as potential, not actual, and produced by a rule, or a choice [Brouwer, by Shapiro] |
10026 | Arithmetic must allow for the possibility of only a finite total of objects [Hodes] |
12451 | Scientific laws largely rest on the results of counting and measuring [Brouwer] |
18118 | Brouwer regards the application of mathematics to the world as somehow 'wicked' [Brouwer, by Bostock] |
10021 | It is claimed that numbers are objects which essentially represent cardinality quantifiers [Hodes] |
10022 | Numerical terms can't really stand for quantifiers, because that would make them first-level [Hodes] |
12454 | Intuitionists only accept denumerable sets [Brouwer] |
12453 | Neo-intuitionism abstracts from the reuniting of moments, to intuit bare two-oneness [Brouwer] |
8728 | Intuitionist mathematics deduces by introspective construction, and rejects unknown truths [Brouwer] |
10023 | Talk of mirror images is 'encoded fictions' about real facts [Hodes] |
22189 | Why abandon a theory if you don't have a better one? [Gorham] |
22190 | If a theory is more informative it is less probable [Gorham] |
22192 | Is Newton simpler with universal simultaneity, or Einstein simpler without absolute time? [Gorham] |
22194 | Structural Realism says mathematical structures persist after theory rejection [Gorham] |
22195 | Structural Realists must show the mathematics is both crucial and separate [Gorham] |
22196 | For most scientists their concepts are not just useful, but are meant to be true and accurate [Gorham] |
22197 | Theories aren't just for organising present experience if they concern the past or future [Gorham] |
22193 | Consilience makes the component sciences more likely [Gorham] |
10117 | Intuitonists in mathematics worried about unjustified assertion, as well as contradiction [Brouwer, by George/Velleman] |
22198 | Aristotelian physics has circular celestial motion and linear earthly motion [Gorham] |