37 ideas
18486 | We might define truth as arising from the truth-maker relation [MacBride] |
18484 | Phenomenalists, behaviourists and presentists can't supply credible truth-makers [MacBride] |
18466 | If truthmaking is classical entailment, then anything whatsoever makes a necessary truth [MacBride] |
18473 | 'Maximalism' says every truth has an actual truthmaker [MacBride] |
18481 | Maximalism follows Russell, and optimalism (no negative or universal truthmakers) follows Wittgenstein [MacBride] |
18483 | The main idea of truth-making is that what a proposition is about is what matters [MacBride] |
18479 | There are different types of truthmakers for different types of negative truth [MacBride] |
18477 | There aren't enough positive states out there to support all the negative truths [MacBride] |
18482 | Optimalists say that negative and universal are true 'by default' from the positive truths [MacBride] |
18474 | Does 'this sentence has no truth-maker' have a truth-maker? Reductio suggests it can't have [MacBride] |
18485 | Even idealists could accept truthmakers, as mind-dependent [MacBride] |
18490 | Maybe 'makes true' is not an active verb, but just a formal connective like 'because'? [MacBride] |
18493 | Truthmaker talk of 'something' making sentences true, which presupposes objectual quantification [MacBride] |
12452 | Our dislike of contradiction in logic is a matter of psychology, not mathematics [Brouwer] |
15941 | For intuitionists excluded middle is an outdated historical convention [Brouwer] |
18489 | Connectives link sentences without linking their meanings [MacBride] |
18476 | 'A is F' may not be positive ('is dead'), and 'A is not-F' may not be negative ('is not blind') [MacBride] |
18119 | Mathematics is a mental activity which does not use language [Brouwer, by Bostock] |
8923 | Numbers are identified by their main properties and relations, involving the successor function [MacBride] |
18247 | Brouwer saw reals as potential, not actual, and produced by a rule, or a choice [Brouwer, by Shapiro] |
12451 | Scientific laws largely rest on the results of counting and measuring [Brouwer] |
18118 | Brouwer regards the application of mathematics to the world as somehow 'wicked' [Brouwer, by Bostock] |
8926 | For mathematical objects to be positions, positions themselves must exist first [MacBride] |
12454 | Intuitionists only accept denumerable sets [Brouwer] |
12453 | Neo-intuitionism abstracts from the reuniting of moments, to intuit bare two-oneness [Brouwer] |
8728 | Intuitionist mathematics deduces by introspective construction, and rejects unknown truths [Brouwer] |
18480 | Maybe it only exists if it is a truthmaker (rather than the value of a variable)? [MacBride] |
18471 | Different types of 'grounding' seem to have no more than a family resemblance relation [MacBride] |
18472 | Which has priority - 'grounding' or 'truth-making'? [MacBride] |
18475 | Russell allows some complex facts, but Wittgenstein only allows atomic facts [MacBride] |
21354 | It may be that internal relations like proportion exist, because we directly perceive it [MacBride] |
21353 | Internal relations are fixed by existences, or characters, or supervenience on characters [MacBride] |
21352 | 'Multigrade' relations are those lacking a fixed number of relata [MacBride] |
18435 | Resemblance Nominalists say that resemblance explains properties (not the other way round) [Rodriquez-Pereyra] |
18436 | Entities are truthmakers for their resemblances, so no extra entities or 'resemblances' are needed [Rodriquez-Pereyra] |
18478 | Wittgenstein's plan to show there is only logical necessity failed, because of colours [MacBride] |
10117 | Intuitonists in mathematics worried about unjustified assertion, as well as contradiction [Brouwer, by George/Velleman] |