Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Luitzen E.J. Brouwer, Keith Campbell and Paul M. Churchland

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29 ideas

4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 7. Paraconsistency
12452 Our dislike of contradiction in logic is a matter of psychology, not mathematics [Brouwer]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
15941 For intuitionists excluded middle is an outdated historical convention [Brouwer]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 6. Relations in Logic
8525 Relations need terms, so they must be second-order entities based on first-order tropes [Campbell,K]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 1. Mathematics
18119 Mathematics is a mental activity which does not use language [Brouwer, by Bostock]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / h. Reals from Cauchy
18247 Brouwer saw reals as potential, not actual, and produced by a rule, or a choice [Brouwer, by Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / g. Applying mathematics
12451 Scientific laws largely rest on the results of counting and measuring [Brouwer]
18118 Brouwer regards the application of mathematics to the world as somehow 'wicked' [Brouwer, by Bostock]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / b. Intuitionism
12454 Intuitionists only accept denumerable sets [Brouwer]
12453 Neo-intuitionism abstracts from the reuniting of moments, to intuit bare two-oneness [Brouwer]
8728 Intuitionist mathematics deduces by introspective construction, and rejects unknown truths [Brouwer]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events
8518 Events are trope-sequences, in which tropes replace one another [Campbell,K]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
8513 Two red cloths are separate instances of redness, because you can dye one of them blue [Campbell,K]
8514 Red could only recur in a variety of objects if it was many, which makes them particulars [Campbell,K]
8522 Tropes solve the Companionship Difficulty, since the resemblance is only between abstract particulars [Campbell,K]
8523 Tropes solve the Imperfect Community problem, as they can only resemble in one respect [Campbell,K]
8524 Trope theory makes space central to reality, as tropes must have a shape and size [Campbell,K]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
8521 Nominalism has the problem that without humans nothing would resemble anything else [Campbell,K]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
8515 Tropes are basic particulars, so concrete particulars are collections of co-located tropes [Campbell,K]
8519 Bundles must be unique, so the Identity of Indiscernibles is a necessity - which it isn't! [Campbell,K]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
4033 Two pure spheres in non-absolute space are identical but indiscernible [Campbell,K]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
4988 Folk psychology may not be reducible, but that doesn't make it false [Kirk,R on Churchland,PM]
4987 Eliminative materialism says folk psychology will be replaced, not reduced [Churchland,PM]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
7518 If folk psychology gives a network of causal laws, that fits neatly with functionalism [Churchland,PM]
7519 Many mental phenomena are totally unexplained by folk psychology [Churchland,PM]
7520 Folk psychology never makes any progress, and is marginalised by modern science [Churchland,PM]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 3. Abstracta by Ignoring
8512 Abstractions come before the mind by concentrating on a part of what is presented [Campbell,K]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
10117 Intuitonists in mathematics worried about unjustified assertion, as well as contradiction [Brouwer, by George/Velleman]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
8517 Causal conditions are particular abstract instances of properties, which makes them tropes [Campbell,K]
8516 Davidson can't explain causation entirely by events, because conditions are also involved [Campbell,K]