27 ideas
7081 | Philosophy is not separate from or above empirical science [Neurath] |
12452 | Our dislike of contradiction in logic is a matter of psychology, not mathematics [Brouwer] |
13479 | Given that thinking aims at truth, logic gives universal rules for how to do it [Burge] |
15941 | For intuitionists excluded middle is an outdated historical convention [Brouwer] |
8132 | We now have a much more sophisticated understanding of logical form in language [Burge] |
17622 | We come to believe mathematical propositions via their grounding in the structure [Burge] |
18119 | Mathematics is a mental activity which does not use language [Brouwer, by Bostock] |
16901 | The equivalent algebra model of geometry loses some essential spatial meaning [Burge] |
9159 | You can't simply convert geometry into algebra, as some spatial content is lost [Burge] |
18247 | Brouwer saw reals as potential, not actual, and produced by a rule, or a choice [Brouwer, by Shapiro] |
12451 | Scientific laws largely rest on the results of counting and measuring [Brouwer] |
18118 | Brouwer regards the application of mathematics to the world as somehow 'wicked' [Brouwer, by Bostock] |
16902 | Peano arithmetic requires grasping 0 as a primitive number [Burge] |
12454 | Intuitionists only accept denumerable sets [Brouwer] |
12453 | Neo-intuitionism abstracts from the reuniting of moments, to intuit bare two-oneness [Brouwer] |
8728 | Intuitionist mathematics deduces by introspective construction, and rejects unknown truths [Brouwer] |
16892 | Is apriority predicated mainly of truths and proofs, or of human cognition? [Burge] |
10486 | If we are rebuilding our ship at sea, we should jettison some cargo [Boolos on Neurath] |
8485 | We must always rebuild our ship on the open sea; we can't reconstruct it properly in dry-dock [Neurath] |
9382 | Subjects may be unaware of their epistemic 'entitlements', unlike their 'justifications' [Burge] |
8126 | Anti-individualism says the environment is involved in the individuation of some mental states [Burge] |
8127 | Broad concepts suggest an extension of the mind into the environment (less computer-like) [Burge] |
8129 | Anti-individualism may be incompatible with some sorts of self-knowledge [Burge] |
8131 | Some qualities of experience, like blurred vision, have no function at all [Burge] |
3115 | Are meaning and expressed concept the same thing? [Burge, by Segal] |
10117 | Intuitonists in mathematics worried about unjustified assertion, as well as contradiction [Brouwer, by George/Velleman] |
14349 | If there are no finks or antidotes at the fundamental level, the laws can't be ceteris paribus [Burge, by Corry] |