Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Luitzen E.J. Brouwer, Pittacus and Joan Kung

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16 ideas

4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 7. Paraconsistency
Our dislike of contradiction in logic is a matter of psychology, not mathematics [Brouwer]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
For intuitionists excluded middle is an outdated historical convention [Brouwer]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 1. Mathematics
Mathematics is a mental activity which does not use language [Brouwer, by Bostock]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / h. Reals from Cauchy
Brouwer saw reals as potential, not actual, and produced by a rule, or a choice [Brouwer, by Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / g. Applying mathematics
Scientific laws largely rest on the results of counting and measuring [Brouwer]
Brouwer regards the application of mathematics to the world as somehow 'wicked' [Brouwer, by Bostock]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / b. Intuitionism
Intuitionists only accept denumerable sets [Brouwer]
Neo-intuitionism abstracts from the reuniting of moments, to intuit bare two-oneness [Brouwer]
Intuitionist mathematics deduces by introspective construction, and rejects unknown truths [Brouwer]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
Jones may cease to exist without some simple property, but that doesn't make it essential [Kung]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / c. Essentials are necessary
A property may belong essentially to one thing and contingently to another [Kung]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
Aristotelian essences underlie a thing's existence, explain it, and must belong to it [Kung]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 8. Transcendental Necessity
Even the gods cannot strive against necessity [Pittacus, by Diog. Laertius]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
Some peripheral properties are explained by essential ones, but don't themselves explain properties [Kung]
Some non-essential properties may explain more than essential-but-peripheral ones do [Kung]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
Intuitonists in mathematics worried about unjustified assertion, as well as contradiction [Brouwer, by George/Velleman]