Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Lukes, Aenesidemus and R Keefe / P Smith

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33 ideas

4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / h. System S5
S5 collapses iterated modalities (◊□P→□P, and ◊◊P→◊P) [Keefe/Smith]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / b. Vagueness of reality
Objects such as a cloud or Mount Everest seem to have fuzzy boundaries in nature [Keefe/Smith]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / c. Vagueness as ignorance
If someone is borderline tall, no further information is likely to resolve the question [Keefe/Smith]
The simplest approach, that vagueness is just ignorance, retains classical logic and semantics [Keefe/Smith]
The epistemic view of vagueness must explain why we don't know the predicate boundary [Keefe/Smith]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / f. Supervaluation for vagueness
Supervaluationism keeps true-or-false where precision can be produced, but not otherwise [Keefe/Smith]
Vague statements lack truth value if attempts to make them precise fail [Keefe/Smith]
Some of the principles of classical logic still fail with supervaluationism [Keefe/Smith]
The semantics of supervaluation (e.g. disjunction and quantification) is not classical [Keefe/Smith]
Supervaluation misunderstands vagueness, treating it as a failure to make things precise [Keefe/Smith]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / g. Degrees of vagueness
A third truth-value at borderlines might be 'indeterminate', or a value somewhere between 0 and 1 [Keefe/Smith]
People can't be placed in a precise order according to how 'nice' they are [Keefe/Smith]
If truth-values for vagueness range from 0 to 1, there must be someone who is 'completely tall' [Keefe/Smith]
How do we decide if my coat is red to degree 0.322 or 0.321? [Keefe/Smith]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
Vague predicates involve uncertain properties, uncertain objects, and paradoxes of gradual change [Keefe/Smith]
Many vague predicates are multi-dimensional; 'big' involves height and volume; heaps include arrangement [Keefe/Smith]
If there is a precise borderline area, that is not a case of vagueness [Keefe/Smith]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 1. Action Theory
There is collective action, where a trend is manifest, but is not attributable to individuals [Lukes]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / h. Against ethics
There is no universal goal to human life [Aenesidemus, by Photius]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 1. Social Power
Hidden powers are the most effective [Lukes]
The pluralist view says that power is restrained by group rivalry [Lukes]
Power is a capacity, which may never need to be exercised [Lukes]
The two-dimensional view of power recognises the importance of controlling the agenda [Lukes]
One-dimensionsal power is behaviour in observable conflicts of interests [Lukes]
Political organisation brings some conflicts to the fore, and suppresses others [Lukes]
The evidence for the exertion of power need not involve a grievance of the powerless [Lukes]
Power is affecting a person in a way contrary to their interests [Lukes]
Power is the capacity of a social class to realise its interests [Lukes]
Supreme power is getting people to have thoughts and desires chosen by you [Lukes]
Power can be exercised to determine a person's desires [Lukes]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 1. Ideology
In the 1950s they said ideology is finished, and expertise takes over [Lukes]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / a. Liberalism basics
Liberals take people as they are, and take their preferences to be their interests [Lukes]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 11. Capitalism
Anyone who thinks capitalism can improve their lives is endorsing capitalism [Lukes]