28 ideas
5750 | Consistency is modal, saying propositions are consistent if they could be true together [Melia] |
5737 | Predicate logic has connectives, quantifiers, variables, predicates, equality, names and brackets [Melia] |
5744 | First-order predicate calculus is extensional logic, but quantified modal logic is intensional (hence dubious) [Melia] |
12797 | If plural variables have 'some values', then non-count variables have 'some value' [Laycock] |
5740 | Second-order logic needs second-order variables and quantification into predicate position [Melia] |
12794 | Plurals are semantical but not ontological [Laycock] |
5741 | If every model that makes premises true also makes conclusion true, the argument is valid [Melia] |
17694 | Some non-count nouns can be used for counting, as in 'several wines' or 'fewer cheeses' [Laycock] |
17695 | Some apparent non-count words can take plural forms, such as 'snows' or 'waters' [Laycock] |
12792 | The category of stuff does not suit reference [Laycock] |
12799 | Descriptions of stuff are neither singular aggregates nor plural collections [Laycock] |
12818 | We shouldn't think some water retains its identity when it is mixed with air [Laycock] |
5736 | No sort of plain language or levels of logic can express modal facts properly [Melia] |
5735 | Maybe names and predicates can capture any fact [Melia] |
12795 | Parts must be of the same very general type as the wholes [Laycock] |
5746 | The Identity of Indiscernibles is contentious for qualities, and trivial for non-qualities [Melia] |
5738 | We may be sure that P is necessary, but is it necessarily necessary? [Melia] |
5732 | 'De re' modality is about things themselves, 'de dicto' modality is about propositions [Melia] |
5739 | Sometimes we want to specify in what ways a thing is possible [Melia] |
5734 | Possible worlds make it possible to define necessity and counterfactuals without new primitives [Melia] |
5742 | In possible worlds semantics the modal operators are treated as quantifiers [Melia] |
5743 | If possible worlds semantics is not realist about possible worlds, logic becomes merely formal [Melia] |
5749 | Possible worlds could be real as mathematics, propositions, properties, or like books [Melia] |
5751 | The truth of propositions at possible worlds are implied by the world, just as in books [Melia] |
604 | Knowledge is mind and knowing 'cohabiting' [Lycophron, by Aristotle] |
17696 | 'Humility is a virtue' has an abstract noun, but 'water is a liquid' has a generic concrete noun [Laycock] |
5748 | We accept unverifiable propositions because of simplicity, utility, explanation and plausibility [Melia] |
12791 | It is said that proper reference is our intellectual link with the world [Laycock] |