Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Lycophron, Tuckness,A/Wolf,C and John Mayberry

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63 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 2. Aims of Definition
Definitions make our intuitions mathematically useful [Mayberry]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 6. Conclusive Proof
Proof shows that it is true, but also why it must be true [Mayberry]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
Set theory can't be axiomatic, because it is needed to express the very notion of axiomatisation [Mayberry]
There is a semi-categorical axiomatisation of set-theory [Mayberry]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / f. Axiom of Infinity V
The misnamed Axiom of Infinity says the natural numbers are finite in size [Mayberry]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / e. Iterative sets
The set hierarchy doesn't rely on the dubious notion of 'generating' them [Mayberry]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / f. Limitation of Size
Limitation of size is part of the very conception of a set [Mayberry]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 2. History of Logic
The mainstream of modern logic sees it as a branch of mathematics [Mayberry]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 5. First-Order Logic
First-order logic only has its main theorems because it is so weak [Mayberry]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
Only second-order logic can capture mathematical structure up to isomorphism [Mayberry]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 2. Domain of Quantification
Big logic has one fixed domain, but standard logic has a domain for each interpretation [Mayberry]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 3. Löwenheim-Skolem Theorems
No Löwenheim-Skolem logic can axiomatise real analysis [Mayberry]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 1. Axiomatisation
'Classificatory' axioms aim at revealing similarity in morphology of structures [Mayberry]
Axiomatiation relies on isomorphic structures being essentially the same [Mayberry]
'Eliminatory' axioms get rid of traditional ideal and abstract objects [Mayberry]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 6. Compactness
No logic which can axiomatise arithmetic can be compact or complete [Mayberry]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
Real numbers can be eliminated, by axiom systems for complete ordered fields [Mayberry]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / b. Quantity
Greek quantities were concrete, and ratio and proportion were their science [Mayberry]
Real numbers were invented, as objects, to simplify and generalise 'quantity' [Mayberry]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / a. The Infinite
Cantor's infinite is an absolute, of all the sets or all the ordinal numbers [Mayberry]
Cantor extended the finite (rather than 'taming the infinite') [Mayberry]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 1. Foundations for Mathematics
If proof and definition are central, then mathematics needs and possesses foundations [Mayberry]
The ultimate principles and concepts of mathematics are presumed, or grasped directly [Mayberry]
Foundations need concepts, definition rules, premises, and proof rules [Mayberry]
Axiom theories can't give foundations for mathematics - that's using axioms to explain axioms [Mayberry]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / d. Peano arithmetic
1st-order PA is only interesting because of results which use 2nd-order PA [Mayberry]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / g. Incompleteness of Arithmetic
It is only 2nd-order isomorphism which suggested first-order PA completeness [Mayberry]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / a. Mathematics is set theory
Set theory is not just first-order ZF, because that is inadequate for mathematics [Mayberry]
We don't translate mathematics into set theory, because it comes embodied in that way [Mayberry]
Set theory is not just another axiomatised part of mathematics [Mayberry]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / a. Nature of abstracta
Real numbers as abstracted objects are now treated as complete ordered fields [Mayberry]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
Knowledge is mind and knowing 'cohabiting' [Lycophron, by Aristotle]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 6. Self as Higher Awareness
Maybe a person's true self is their second-order desires [Tuckness/Wolf]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
If maximising pleasure needs measurement, so does fulfilling desires [Tuckness/Wolf]
Desire satisfaction as the ideal is confused, because we desire what we judge to be good [Tuckness/Wolf]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / c. A unified people
In a democracy, which 'people' are included in the decision process? [Tuckness/Wolf]
People often have greater attachment to ethnic or tribal groups than to the state [Tuckness/Wolf]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 4. Original Position / a. Original position
For global justice, adopt rules without knowing which country you will inhabit [Tuckness/Wolf]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 4. Original Position / b. Veil of ignorance
The veil of ignorance ensures both fairness and unanimity [Tuckness/Wolf]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / a. Sovereignty
Unjust institutions may be seen as just; are they legitimate if just but seen as unjust? [Tuckness/Wolf]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / d. Elites
If winning elections depends on wealth, we have plutocracy instead of democracy [Tuckness/Wolf]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / a. Nature of democracy
Epistemic theories defend democracy as more likely to produce the right answer [Tuckness/Wolf]
Which areas of public concern should be decided democratically, and which not? [Tuckness/Wolf]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / b. Consultation
If several losing groups would win if they combine, a runoff seems called for [Tuckness/Wolf]
Rights as interests (unlike rights as autonomy) supports mandatory voting [Tuckness/Wolf]
How should democratic votes be aggregated? Can some person's votes count for more? [Tuckness/Wolf]
Discussion before voting should be an essential part of democracy [Tuckness/Wolf]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / a. Communitarianism
We have obligations to our family, even though we didn't choose its members [Tuckness/Wolf]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 3. Free speech
Free speech does not include the right to shout 'Fire!' in a crowded theatre [Tuckness/Wolf]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 1. Grounds of equality
Most people want equality because they want a flourishing life [Tuckness/Wolf]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 4. Economic equality
If there is no suffering, wealth inequalities don't matter much [Tuckness/Wolf]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
Some rights are 'claims' that other people should act in a certain way [Tuckness/Wolf]
Choice theory says protecting individual autonomy is basic (but needs to cover infants and animals) [Tuckness/Wolf]
One theory (fairly utilitarian) says rights protect interests (but it needs to cover trivial interests) [Tuckness/Wolf]
Having a right does not entail further rights needed to implement it [Tuckness/Wolf]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / a. Legal system
If being subject to the law resembles a promise, we are morally obliged to obey it [Tuckness/Wolf]
If others must obey laws that we like, we must obey laws that they like? [Tuckness/Wolf]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / c. Natural law
Instead of against natural law, we might assess unjust laws against the values of the culture [Tuckness/Wolf]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / b. Retribution for crime
How should the punishment fit the crime (for stealing chickens?) [Tuckness/Wolf]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / a. Just wars
Just wars: resist aggression, done on just cause, proportionate, last resort, not futile, legal [Tuckness/Wolf]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / b. Justice in war
During wars: proportional force, fair targets, fair weapons, safe prisoners, no reprisals [Tuckness/Wolf]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 2. Religion in Society
If minority views are accepted in debate, then religious views must be accepted [Tuckness/Wolf]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 3. Abortion
Is abortion the ending of a life, or a decision not to start one? [Tuckness/Wolf]