13 ideas
16062 | A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16061 | If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16060 | Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16064 | The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow] |
4304 | Descartes says there are two substance, Spinoza one, and Leibniz infinitely many [Cottingham] |
14637 | Only individuals have essences, so numbers (as a higher type based on classes) lack them [McMichael] |
14636 | Essences are the interesting necessary properties resulting from a thing's own peculiar nature [McMichael] |
14640 | Maybe essential properties have to be intrinsic, as well as necessary? [McMichael] |
14638 | Essentialism is false, because it implies the existence of necessary singular propositions [McMichael] |
4303 | The notion of substance lies at the heart of rationalist metaphysics [Cottingham] |
4316 | Either all action is rational, or reason dominates, or reason is only concerned with means [Cottingham] |
4306 | For rationalists, it is necessary that effects be deducible from their causes [Cottingham] |
14639 | Individuals enter into laws only through their general qualities and relations [McMichael] |