107 ideas
3240 | There is more insight in fundamental perplexity about problems than in their supposed solutions [Nagel] |
8013 | In the Reformation, morality became unconditional but irrational, individually autonomous, and secular [MacIntyre] |
8021 | The Levellers and the Diggers mark a turning point in the history of morality [MacIntyre] |
8060 | In the 17th-18th centuries morality offered a cure for egoism, through altruism [MacIntyre] |
8053 | Twentieth century social life is re-enacting eighteenth century philosophy [MacIntyre] |
3269 | If your life is to be meaningful as part of some large thing, the large thing must be meaningful [Nagel] |
3242 | Philosophy is the childhood of the intellect, and a culture can't skip it [Nagel] |
3241 | It seems mad, but the aim of philosophy is to climb outside of our own minds [Nagel] |
8047 | Philosophy has been marginalised by its failure in the Enlightenment to replace religion [MacIntyre] |
1489 | Modern philosophy tends to be a theory-constructing extension of science, but there is also problem-solving [Nagel] |
3248 | Realism invites scepticism because it claims to be objective [Nagel] |
20989 | Views are objective if they don't rely on a person's character, social position or species [Nagel] |
22354 | Things cause perceptions, properties have other effects, hence we reach a 'view from nowhere' [Nagel, by Reiss/Sprenger] |
8062 | Proof is a barren idea in philosophy, and the best philosophy never involves proof [MacIntyre] |
16062 | A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow] |
4242 | Pure supervenience explains nothing, and is a sign of something fundamental we don't know [Nagel] |
16061 | If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16060 | Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16064 | The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow] |
3291 | Emergent properties appear at high levels of complexity, but aren't explainable by the lower levels [Nagel] |
3249 | Modern science depends on the distinction between primary and secondary qualities [Nagel] |
22429 | We achieve objectivity by dropping secondary qualities, to focus on structural primary qualities [Nagel] |
3296 | Sense-data are a false objectification of what is essentially subjective [Nagel] |
8052 | To find empiricism and science in the same culture is surprising, as they are really incompatible [MacIntyre] |
3247 | Epistemology is centrally about what we should believe, not the definition of knowledge [Nagel] |
3271 | We can't control our own beliefs [Nagel] |
3270 | Justifications come to an end when we want them to [Nagel] |
3252 | Scepticism is based on ideas which scepticism makes impossible [Nagel] |
10356 | Relativism can be seen as about the rationality of different cultural traditions [MacIntyre, by Kusch] |
1490 | You would have to be very morally lazy to ignore criticisms of your own culture [Nagel] |
8057 | Unpredictability doesn't entail inexplicability, and predictability doesn't entail explicability [MacIntyre] |
8054 | Social sciences discover no law-like generalisations, and tend to ignore counterexamples [MacIntyre] |
3251 | Observed regularities are only predictable if we assume hidden necessity [Nagel] |
3295 | Inner v outer brings astonishment that we are a particular person [Nagel] |
8006 | When Aristotle speaks of soul he means something like personality [MacIntyre] |
2957 | Brain bisection suggests unity of mind isn't all-or-nothing [Nagel, by Lockwood] |
3286 | An organism is conscious if and only if there is something it is like to be that organism [Nagel] |
3285 | We may be unable to abandon personal identity, even when split-brains have undermined it [Nagel] |
3293 | If you assert that we have an ego, you can still ask if that future ego will be me [Nagel] |
3244 | Personal identity cannot be fully known a priori [Nagel] |
3245 | The question of whether a future experience will be mine presupposes personal identity [Nagel] |
3246 | I can't even conceive of my brain being split in two [Nagel] |
21050 | I can only make decisions if I see myself as part of a story [MacIntyre] |
3292 | The most difficult problem of free will is saying what the problem is [Nagel] |
3288 | Can we describe our experiences to zombies? [Nagel] |
4883 | Nagel's title creates an impenetrable mystery, by ignoring a bat's ways that may not be "like" anything [Dennett on Nagel] |
3287 | We can't be objective about experience [Nagel] |
4989 | Physicalism should explain how subjective experience is possible, but not 'what it is like' [Kirk,R on Nagel] |
8056 | AI can't predict innovation, or consequences, or external relations, or external events [MacIntyre] |
4001 | The meaning of a word contains all its possible uses as well as its actual ones [Nagel] |
6479 | Noninterference requires justification as much as interference does [Nagel] |
6450 | Morality must be motivating, and not because of pre-moral motives [Nagel] |
8059 | The good life for man is the life spent seeking the good life for man [MacIntyre] |
3284 | There is no one theory of how to act (or what to believe) [Nagel] |
8034 | We still have the appearance and language of morality, but we no longer understand it [MacIntyre] |
8036 | Unlike expressions of personal preference, evaluative expressions do not depend on context [MacIntyre] |
8049 | Moral judgements now are anachronisms from a theistic age [MacIntyre] |
8045 | The failure of Enlightenment attempts to justify morality will explain our own culture [MacIntyre] |
8051 | Mention of 'intuition' in morality means something has gone wrong with the argument [MacIntyre] |
8048 | When 'man' is thought of individually, apart from all roles, it ceases to be a functional concept [MacIntyre] |
8035 | In trying to explain the type of approval involved, emotivists are either silent, or viciously circular [MacIntyre] |
8037 | The expression of feeling in a sentence is in its use, not in its meaning [MacIntyre] |
8040 | Emotivism cannot explain the logical terms in moral discourse ('therefore', 'if..then') [MacIntyre] |
8042 | Nowadays most people are emotivists, and it is embodied in our culture [MacIntyre] |
8002 | Sophists don't distinguish a person outside one social order from someone outside all order [MacIntyre] |
8012 | The value/fact logical gulf is misleading, because social facts involve values [MacIntyre] |
3257 | Total objectivity can't see value, but it sees many people with values [Nagel] |
3265 | We don't worry about the time before we were born the way we worry about death [Nagel] |
3263 | If our own life lacks meaning, devotion to others won't give it meaning [Nagel] |
3256 | Pain doesn't have a further property of badness; it gives a reason for its avoidance [Nagel] |
3272 | Moral luck can arise in character, preconditions, actual circumstances, and outcome [Nagel] |
8005 | 'Happiness' is a bad translation of 'eudaimonia', which includes both behaving and faring well [MacIntyre] |
6447 | Game theory misses out the motivation arising from the impersonal standpoint [Nagel] |
8058 | Maybe we can only understand rules if we first understand the virtues [MacIntyre] |
7097 | Virtue is secondary to a role-figure, defined within a culture [MacIntyre, by Statman] |
8043 | Characters are the masks worn by moral philosophies [MacIntyre] |
8061 | If morality just is emotion, there are no external criteria for judging emotions [MacIntyre] |
8001 | 'Dikaiosune' is justice, but also fairness and personal integrity [MacIntyre] |
3261 | Something may be 'rational' either because it is required or because it is acceptable [Nagel] |
3258 | If cockroaches can't think about their actions, they have no duties [Nagel] |
8023 | My duties depend on my identity, which depends on my social relations [MacIntyre] |
3282 | The general form of moral reasoning is putting yourself in other people's shoes [Nagel] |
3294 | As far as possible we should become instruments to realise what is best from an eternal point of view [Nagel] |
3254 | If we can decide how to live after stepping outside of ourselves, we have the basis of a moral theory [Nagel] |
3264 | We should see others' viewpoints, but not lose touch with our own values [Nagel] |
6446 | In ethics we abstract from our identity, but not from our humanity [Nagel] |
6477 | I can only universalise a maxim if everyone else could also universalise it [Nagel] |
3255 | We find new motives by discovering reasons for action different from our preexisting motives [Nagel] |
8038 | Since Moore thinks the right action produces the most good, he is a utilitarian [MacIntyre] |
3262 | Utilitarianism is too demanding [Nagel] |
3268 | If a small brief life is absurd, then so is a long and large one [Nagel] |
8022 | I am naturally free if I am not tied to anyone by a contract [MacIntyre] |
8050 | There are no natural or human rights, and belief in them is nonsense [MacIntyre] |
3278 | An egalitarian system must give priority to those with the worst prospects in life [Nagel] |
6448 | A legitimate system is one accepted as both impartial and reasonably partial [Nagel] |
23080 | Liberals debate how conservative or radical to be, but don't question their basics [MacIntyre] |
3277 | In judging disputes, should we use one standard, or those of each individual? [Nagel] |
3275 | Equality was once opposed to aristocracy, but now it opposes public utility and individual rights [Nagel] |
3281 | The ideal of acceptability to each individual underlies the appeal to equality [Nagel] |
3273 | Equality nowadays is seen as political, social, legal and economic [Nagel] |
3274 | Equality can either be defended as good for society, or as good for individual rights [Nagel] |
6478 | Democracy is opposed to equality, if the poor are not a majority [Nagel] |
3276 | A morality of rights is very minimal, leaving a lot of human life without restrictions or duties [Nagel] |
8031 | Fans of natural rights or laws can't agree on what the actual rights or laws are [MacIntyre] |
3290 | Given the nature of heat and of water, it is literally impossible for water not to boil at the right heat [Nagel] |
8055 | If God is omniscient, he confronts no as yet unmade decisions, so decisions are impossible [MacIntyre] |
8008 | The Bible is a story about God in which humans are incidental characters [MacIntyre] |