22 ideas
2510 | Traditionally philosophy is an a priori enquiry into general truths about reality [Katz] |
2516 | Most of philosophy begins where science leaves off [Katz] |
7306 | If the only property of a name was its reference, we couldn't explain bearerless names [Miller,A] |
2521 | 'Real' maths objects have no causal role, no determinate reference, and no abstract/concrete distinction [Katz] |
16062 | A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16061 | If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16060 | Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16064 | The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow] |
2513 | We don't have a clear enough sense of meaning to pronounce some sentences meaningless or just analytic [Katz] |
2522 | Experience cannot teach us why maths and logic are necessary [Katz] |
7322 | Constitutive scepticism is about facts, and epistemological scepticism about our ability to know them [Miller,A] |
7325 | Dispositions say what we will do, not what we ought to do, so can't explain normativity [Miller,A] |
2517 | Structuralists see meaning behaviouristically, and Chomsky says nothing about it [Katz] |
7324 | Explain meaning by propositional attitudes, or vice versa, or together? [Miller,A] |
2519 | It is generally accepted that sense is defined as the determiner of reference [Katz] |
2520 | Sense determines meaning and synonymy, not referential properties like denotation and truth [Katz] |
7323 | If truth is deflationary, sentence truth-conditions just need good declarative syntax [Miller,A] |
2518 | Sentences are abstract types (like musical scores), not individual tokens [Katz] |
7315 | 'Jones is a married bachelor' does not have the logical form of a contradiction [Miller,A] |
7328 | The principle of charity is holistic, saying we must hold most of someone's system of beliefs to be true [Miller,A] |
7329 | Maybe we should interpret speakers as intelligible, rather than speaking truth [Miller,A] |
7333 | The Frege-Geach problem is that I can discuss the wrongness of murder without disapproval [Miller,A] |