Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM, Alexander Miller and Steven Pinker

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23 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
7306 If the only property of a name was its reference, we couldn't explain bearerless names [Miller,A]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
7508 Good reductionism connects fields of knowledge, but doesn't replace one with another [Pinker]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 3. Levels of Reality
16062 A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
16061 If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
16060 Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow]
16064 The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 2. Associationism
7510 Connectionists say the mind is a general purpose learning device [Pinker]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
7513 Is memory stored in protein sequences, neurons, synapses, or synapse-strengths? [Pinker]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 2. Types of Scepticism
7322 Constitutive scepticism is about facts, and epistemological scepticism about our ability to know them [Miller,A]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
7509 Roundworms live successfully with 302 neurons, so human freedom comes from our trillions [Pinker]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
7325 Dispositions say what we will do, not what we ought to do, so can't explain normativity [Miller,A]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 4. Connectionism
7511 Neural networks can generalise their training, e.g. truths about tigers apply mostly to lions [Pinker]
7512 There are five types of reasoning that seem beyond connectionist systems [Pinker, by PG]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
7324 Explain meaning by propositional attitudes, or vice versa, or together? [Miller,A]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
7323 If truth is deflationary, sentence truth-conditions just need good declarative syntax [Miller,A]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 2. Analytic Truths
7315 'Jones is a married bachelor' does not have the logical form of a contradiction [Miller,A]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
7328 The principle of charity is holistic, saying we must hold most of someone's system of beliefs to be true [Miller,A]
7329 Maybe we should interpret speakers as intelligible, rather than speaking truth [Miller,A]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
7505 Many think that accepting human nature is to accept innumerable evils [Pinker]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
7333 The Frege-Geach problem is that I can discuss the wrongness of murder without disapproval [Miller,A]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 2. Life
7516 In 1828, the stuff of life was shown to be ordinary chemistry, not a magic gel [Pinker]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
7515 All the evidence says evolution is cruel and wasteful, not intelligent [Pinker]
7514 Intelligent Design says that every unexplained phenomenon must be design, by default [Pinker]