13 ideas
| 11193 | Understanding begins with the notion of being and essence [Avicenna] |
| 17950 | The logos enables us to track one particular among a network of objects [Nehamas] |
| 17951 | A logos may be short, but it contains reference to the whole domain of the object [Nehamas] |
| 16062 | A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16061 | If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16060 | Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16064 | The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 17945 | Forms are not a theory of universals, but an attempt to explain how predication is possible [Nehamas] |
| 17946 | Only Tallness really is tall, and other inferior tall things merely participate in the tallness [Nehamas] |
| 11209 | The simple's whatness is its very self [Avicenna] |
| 11204 | The ultimate material of things has the unity of total formlessness [Avicenna] |
| 15036 | An essence can either be universal (in the mind) or singular (in concrete particulars) [Avicenna, by Panaccio] |
| 17944 | 'Episteme' is better translated as 'understanding' than as 'knowledge' [Nehamas] |