16 ideas
| 8250 | So-called 'free logic' operates without existence assumptions [Meinong, by George/Van Evra] |
| 16062 | A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16061 | If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16060 | Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16064 | The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 4483 | If abstract terms are sets of tropes, 'being a unicorn' and 'being a griffin' turn out identical [Loux] |
| 4481 | Austere nominalists insist that the realist's universals lack the requisite independent identifiability [Loux] |
| 4477 | Universals come in hierarchies of generality [Loux] |
| 4482 | Austere nominalism has to take a host of things (like being red, or human) as primitive [Loux] |
| 4478 | Nominalism needs to account for abstract singular terms like 'circularity'. [Loux] |
| 8719 | There can be impossible and contradictory objects, if they can have properties [Meinong, by Friend] |
| 8971 | There are objects of which it is true that there are no such objects [Meinong] |
| 8718 | Meinong says an object need not exist, but must only have properties [Meinong, by Friend] |
| 7756 | Meinong said all objects of thought (even self-contradictions) have some sort of being [Meinong, by Lycan] |
| 15781 | The objects of knowledge are far more numerous than objects which exist [Meinong] |
| 4480 | Times and places are identified by objects, so cannot be used in a theory of object-identity [Loux] |