33 ideas
16062 | A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16061 | If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16060 | Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16064 | The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow] |
14064 | If a statue is identical with the clay of which it is made, that identity is contingent [Gibbard] |
14066 | A 'piece' of clay begins when its parts stick together, separately from other clay [Gibbard] |
14067 | Clay and statue are two objects, which can be named and reasoned about [Gibbard] |
14069 | We can only investigate the identity once we have designated it as 'statue' or as 'clay' [Gibbard] |
14076 | Essentialism is the existence of a definite answer as to whether an entity fulfils a condition [Gibbard] |
14077 | Essentialism for concreta is false, since they can come apart under two concepts [Gibbard] |
14070 | A particular statue has sortal persistence conditions, so its origin defines it [Gibbard] |
14073 | Claims on contingent identity seem to violate Leibniz's Law [Gibbard] |
14065 | Two identical things must share properties - including creation and destruction times [Gibbard] |
14074 | Leibniz's Law isn't just about substitutivity, because it must involve properties and relations [Gibbard] |
14072 | Possible worlds identity needs a sortal [Gibbard] |
14078 | Only concepts, not individuals, can be the same across possible worlds [Gibbard] |
14079 | Kripke's semantics needs lots of intuitions about which properties are essential [Gibbard] |
14071 | Naming a thing in the actual world also invokes some persistence criteria [Gibbard] |
22858 | There is collective action, where a trend is manifest, but is not attributable to individuals [Lukes] |
22850 | Hidden powers are the most effective [Lukes] |
22854 | Power is a capacity, which may never need to be exercised [Lukes] |
22852 | The pluralist view says that power is restrained by group rivalry [Lukes] |
22855 | One-dimensionsal power is behaviour in observable conflicts of interests [Lukes] |
22856 | Political organisation brings some conflicts to the fore, and suppresses others [Lukes] |
22857 | The two-dimensional view of power recognises the importance of controlling the agenda [Lukes] |
22859 | Power can be exercised to determine a person's desires [Lukes] |
22863 | Power is the capacity of a social class to realise its interests [Lukes] |
22860 | The evidence for the exertion of power need not involve a grievance of the powerless [Lukes] |
22861 | Power is affecting a person in a way contrary to their interests [Lukes] |
21133 | Supreme power is getting people to have thoughts and desires chosen by you [Lukes] |
22851 | In the 1950s they said ideology is finished, and expertise takes over [Lukes] |
22862 | Liberals take people as they are, and take their preferences to be their interests [Lukes] |
22853 | Anyone who thinks capitalism can improve their lives is endorsing capitalism [Lukes] |