32 ideas
4262 | If the only aim was consistent beliefs then new evidence and experiments would be irrelevant [Goldman] |
4045 | Children may have three innate principles which enable them to learn to count [Goldman] |
4044 | Rat behaviour reveals a considerable ability to count [Goldman] |
16062 | A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16061 | If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16060 | Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16064 | The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow] |
4048 | Infant brains appear to have inbuilt ontological categories [Goldman] |
13076 | Scholastics treat relations as two separate predicates of the relata [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
13102 | If you individuate things by their origin, you still have to individuate the origins themselves [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
13103 | Numerical difference is a symmetrical notion, unlike proper individuation [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
13104 | Haecceity as property, or as colourless thisness, or as singleton set [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
13100 | Maybe 'substance' is more of a mass-noun than a count-noun [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
13068 | We can ask for the nature of substance, about type of substance, and about individual substances [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
13069 | The general assumption is that substances cannot possibly be non-substances [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
13072 | Modern essences are sets of essential predicate-functions [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
17080 | Modern essentialists express essence as functions from worlds to extensions for predicates [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
13101 | Necessity-of-origin won't distinguish ex nihilo creations, or things sharing an origin [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
13081 | Even extreme modal realists might allow transworld identity for abstract objects [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
4043 | Elephants can be correctly identified from as few as three primitive shapes [Goldman] |
4049 | The way in which colour experiences are evoked is physically odd and unpredictable [Goldman] |
4047 | Gestalt psychology proposes inbuilt proximity, similarity, smoothness and closure principles [Goldman] |
8830 | A belief can be justified when the person has forgotten the evidence for it [Goldman] |
6871 | We can't only believe things if we are currently conscious of their justification - there are too many [Goldman] |
6872 | Internalism must cover Forgotten Evidence, which is no longer retrievable from memory [Goldman] |
6874 | Internal justification needs both mental stability and time to compute coherence [Goldman] |
8832 | If justified beliefs are well-formed beliefs, then animals and young children have them [Goldman] |
6873 | Coherent justification seems to require retrieving all our beliefs simultaneously [Goldman] |
8829 | Justification depends on the reliability of its cause, where reliable processes tend to produce truth [Goldman] |
6875 | Reliability involves truth, and truth is external [Goldman] |
13071 | We can go beyond mere causal explanations if we believe in an 'order of being' [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
8831 | Introspection is really retrospection; my pain is justified by a brief causal history [Goldman] |