30 ideas
8952 | We reach 'reflective equilibrium' when intuitions and theory completely align [Fisher] |
4262 | If the only aim was consistent beliefs then new evidence and experiments would be irrelevant [Goldman] |
8943 | Three-valued logic says excluded middle and non-contradition are not tautologies [Fisher] |
8945 | Fuzzy logic has many truth values, ranging in fractions from 0 to 1 [Fisher] |
8951 | Classical logic is: excluded middle, non-contradiction, contradictions imply all, disjunctive syllogism [Fisher] |
8950 | Logic formalizes how we should reason, but it shouldn't determine whether we are realists [Fisher] |
4045 | Children may have three innate principles which enable them to learn to count [Goldman] |
4044 | Rat behaviour reveals a considerable ability to count [Goldman] |
16062 | A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16061 | If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16060 | Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16064 | The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow] |
8946 | We could make our intuitions about heaps precise with a million-valued logic [Fisher] |
4048 | Infant brains appear to have inbuilt ontological categories [Goldman] |
8944 | Vagueness can involve components (like baldness), or not (like boredom) [Fisher] |
8941 | We can't explain 'possibility' in terms of 'possible' worlds [Fisher] |
8947 | If all truths are implied by a falsehood, then not-p might imply both q and not-q [Fisher] |
8949 | In relevance logic, conditionals help information to flow from antecedent to consequent [Fisher] |
4043 | Elephants can be correctly identified from as few as three primitive shapes [Goldman] |
4049 | The way in which colour experiences are evoked is physically odd and unpredictable [Goldman] |
4047 | Gestalt psychology proposes inbuilt proximity, similarity, smoothness and closure principles [Goldman] |
8830 | A belief can be justified when the person has forgotten the evidence for it [Goldman] |
6871 | We can't only believe things if we are currently conscious of their justification - there are too many [Goldman] |
6872 | Internalism must cover Forgotten Evidence, which is no longer retrievable from memory [Goldman] |
6874 | Internal justification needs both mental stability and time to compute coherence [Goldman] |
8832 | If justified beliefs are well-formed beliefs, then animals and young children have them [Goldman] |
6873 | Coherent justification seems to require retrieving all our beliefs simultaneously [Goldman] |
8829 | Justification depends on the reliability of its cause, where reliable processes tend to produce truth [Goldman] |
6875 | Reliability involves truth, and truth is external [Goldman] |
8831 | Introspection is really retrospection; my pain is justified by a brief causal history [Goldman] |