72 ideas
20455 | Philosophy really got started as the rival mode of discourse to tragedy [Critchley] |
20446 | Philosophy begins in disappointment, notably in religion and politics [Critchley] |
6848 | Humour is practically enacted philosophy [Critchley] |
6847 | Humour can give a phenomenological account of existence, and point to change [Critchley] |
7068 | If infatuation with science leads to bad scientism, its rejection leads to obscurantism [Critchley] |
6844 | Scientism is the view that everything can be explained causally through scientific method [Critchley] |
20449 | Science gives us an excessively theoretical view of life [Critchley] |
7075 | To meet the division in our life, try the Subject, Nature, Spirit, Will, Power, Praxis, Unconscious, or Being [Critchley] |
7069 | The French keep returning, to Hegel or Nietzsche or Marx [Critchley] |
6835 | German idealism aimed to find a unifying principle for Kant's various dualisms [Critchley] |
6837 | Since Hegel, continental philosophy has been linked with social and historical enquiry. [Critchley] |
6836 | Continental philosophy fights the threatened nihilism in the critique of reason [Critchley] |
6838 | Continental philosophy is based on critique, praxis and emancipation [Critchley] |
6845 | Continental philosophy has a bad tendency to offer 'one big thing' to explain everything [Critchley] |
6846 | Phenomenology is a technique of redescription which clarifies our social world [Critchley] |
20448 | Phenomenology uncovers and redescribes the pre-theoretical layer of life [Critchley] |
14650 | Maybe proper names involve essentialism [Plantinga] |
14648 | Could I name all of the real numbers in one fell swoop? Call them all 'Charley'? [Plantinga] |
14664 | Necessary beings (numbers, properties, sets, propositions, states of affairs, God) exist in all possible worlds [Plantinga] |
16062 | A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16061 | If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16060 | Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16064 | The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16435 | Plantinga proposes necessary existent essences as surrogates for the nonexistent things [Plantinga, by Stalnaker] |
14655 | The 'identity criteria' of a name are a group of essential and established facts [Plantinga] |
14647 | Surely self-identity is essential to Socrates? [Plantinga] |
14658 | 'Being Socrates' and 'being identical with Socrates' characterise Socrates, so they are among his properties [Plantinga] |
13132 | A snowball's haecceity is the property of being identical with itself [Plantinga, by Westerhoff] |
14666 | Socrates is a contingent being, but his essence is not; without Socrates, his essence is unexemplified [Plantinga] |
14656 | Does Socrates have essential properties, plus a unique essence (or 'haecceity') which entails them? [Plantinga] |
14646 | An object has a property essentially if it couldn't conceivably have lacked it [Plantinga] |
14654 | Properties are 'trivially essential' if they are instantiated by every object in every possible world [Plantinga] |
14653 | X is essentially P if it is P in every world, or in every X-world, or in the actual world (and not ¬P elsewhere) [Plantinga] |
14660 | If a property is ever essential, can it only ever be an essential property? [Plantinga] |
14661 | Essences are instantiated, and are what entails a thing's properties and lack of properties [Plantinga] |
14657 | Does 'being identical with Socrates' name a property? I can think of no objections to it [Plantinga] |
14642 | Expressing modality about a statement is 'de dicto'; expressing it of property-possession is 'de re' [Plantinga] |
14643 | 'De dicto' true and 'de re' false is possible, and so is 'de dicto' false and 'de re' true [Plantinga] |
14649 | Can we find an appropriate 'de dicto' paraphrase for any 'de re' proposition? [Plantinga] |
14652 | 'De re' modality is as clear as 'de dicto' modality, because they are logically equivalent [Plantinga] |
14659 | We can imagine being beetles or alligators, so it is possible we might have such bodies [Plantinga] |
11984 | Asserting a possible property is to say it would have had the property if that world had been actual [Plantinga] |
14662 | Possible worlds clarify possibility, propositions, properties, sets, counterfacts, time, determinism etc. [Plantinga] |
18383 | Plantinga says there is just this world, with possibilities expressed in propositions [Plantinga, by Armstrong] |
16472 | Plantinga's actualism is nominal, because he fills actuality with possibilia [Stalnaker on Plantinga] |
11980 | A possible world is a maximal possible state of affairs [Plantinga] |
14651 | What Socrates could have been, and could have become, are different? [Plantinga] |
11982 | If possible Socrates differs from actual Socrates, the Indiscernibility of Identicals says they are different [Plantinga] |
11983 | It doesn't matter that we can't identify the possible Socrates; we can't identify adults from baby photos [Plantinga] |
11985 | If individuals can only exist in one world, then they can never lack any of their properties [Plantinga] |
11891 | Possibilities for an individual can only refer to that individual, in some possible world [Plantinga, by Mackie,P] |
11986 | The counterparts of Socrates have self-identity, but only the actual Socrates has identity-with-Socrates [Plantinga] |
11987 | Counterpart Theory absurdly says I would be someone else if things went differently [Plantinga] |
6356 | Maybe a reliable justification must come from a process working with its 'proper function' [Plantinga, by Pollock/Cruz] |
9086 | The idea of abstract objects is not ontological; it comes from the epistemological idea of abstraction [Plantinga] |
9087 | Theists may see abstract objects as really divine thoughts [Plantinga] |
16469 | Plantinga has domains of sets of essences, variables denoting essences, and predicates as functions [Plantinga, by Stalnaker] |
16470 | Plantinga's essences have their own properties - so will have essences, giving a hierarchy [Stalnaker on Plantinga] |
14663 | Are propositions and states of affairs two separate things, or only one? I incline to say one [Plantinga] |
9085 | If propositions are concrete they don't have to exist, and so they can't be necessary truths [Plantinga] |
9084 | Propositions can't just be in brains, because 'there are no human beings' might be true [Plantinga] |
20454 | Wallace Stevens is the greatest philosophical poet of the twentieth century in English [Critchley] |
20456 | Interesting art is always organised around ethical demands [Critchley] |
20447 | The problems is not justifying ethics, but motivating it. Why should a self seek its good? [Critchley] |
7067 | Food first, then ethics [Critchley] |
6843 | Perceiving meaninglessness is an achievement, which can transform daily life [Critchley] |
20452 | Anarchism used to be libertarian (especially for sexuality), but now concerns responsibility [Critchley] |
20450 | The state, law, bureaucracy and capital are limitations on life, so I prefer federalist anarchism [Critchley] |
20451 | Belief that humans are wicked leads to authoritarian politics [Critchley] |
20704 | A possible world contains a being of maximal greatness - which is existence in all worlds [Plantinga, by Davies,B] |
1474 | Moral evil may be acceptable to God because it allows free will (even though we don't see why this is necessary) [Plantinga, by PG] |
1475 | It is logically possible that natural evil like earthquakes is caused by Satan [Plantinga, by PG] |