Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM, Andr Gallois and Dean W. Zimmerman

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16 ideas

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 3. Levels of Reality
16062 A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
16061 If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
16060 Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow]
16064 The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 3. Instantiated Universals
10197 An immanent universal is wholly present in more than one place [Zimmerman,DW]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / b. Cat and its tail
13437 A CAR and its major PART can become identical, yet seem to have different properties [Gallois]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 1. Objects over Time
16233 Gallois hoped to clarify identity through time, but seems to make talk of it impossible [Hawley on Gallois]
16025 If things change they become different - but then no one thing undergoes the change! [Gallois]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 4. Four-Dimensionalism
16026 4D: time is space-like; a thing is its history; past and future are real; or things extend in time [Gallois]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
14755 Gallois is committed to identity with respect to times, and denial of simple identity [Gallois, by Sider]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
16231 Occasional Identity: two objects can be identical at one time, and different at others [Gallois, by Hawley]
16027 If two things are equal, each side involves a necessity, so the equality is necessary [Gallois]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
10198 If only two indiscernible electrons exist, future differences must still be possible [Zimmerman,DW]
10199 Discernible differences at different times may just be in counterparts [Zimmerman,DW]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / g. Growing block
14610 Neither 'moving spotlight' nor 'growing block' views explain why we care what is present or past [Zimmerman,DW]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / e. Tensed (A) series
14608 A-theorists, unlike B-theorists, believe some sort of objective distinction between past, present and future [Zimmerman,DW]