35 ideas
6675 | The heart has its reasons of which reason knows nothing [Pascal] |
11223 | Definitions usually have a term, a 'definiendum' containing the term, and a defining 'definiens' [Gupta] |
11215 | Notable definitions have been of piety (Plato), God (Anselm), number (Frege), and truth (Tarski) [Gupta] |
11225 | A definition needs to apply to the same object across possible worlds [Gupta] |
11227 | The 'revision theory' says that definitions are rules for improving output [Gupta] |
11221 | A definition can be 'extensionally', 'intensionally' or 'sense' adequate [Gupta] |
11224 | Traditional definitions are general identities, which are sentential and reductive [Gupta] |
11226 | Traditional definitions need: same category, mention of the term, and conservativeness and eliminability [Gupta] |
11217 | Chemists aim at real definition of things; lexicographers aim at nominal definition of usage [Gupta] |
11216 | If definitions aim at different ideals, then defining essence is not a unitary activity [Gupta] |
11218 | Stipulative definition assigns meaning to a term, ignoring prior meanings [Gupta] |
11220 | Ostensive definitions look simple, but are complex and barely explicable [Gupta] |
14965 | Truth rests on Elimination ('A' is true → A) and Introduction (A → 'A' is true) [Gupta] |
14968 | A weakened classical language can contain its own truth predicate [Gupta] |
11222 | The ordered pair <x,y> is defined as the set {{x},{x,y}}, capturing function, not meaning [Gupta] |
10121 | Contradiction is not a sign of falsity, nor lack of contradiction a sign of truth [Pascal] |
14964 | The Liar reappears, even if one insists on propositions instead of sentences [Gupta] |
14969 | Strengthened Liar: either this sentence is neither-true-nor-false, or it is not true [Gupta] |
16062 | A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16061 | If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16060 | Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16064 | The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow] |
22011 | The first principles of truth are not rational, but are known by the heart [Pascal] |
6681 | We only want to know things so that we can talk about them [Pascal] |
6676 | Painting makes us admire things of which we do not admire the originals [Pascal] |
6680 | It is a funny sort of justice whose limits are marked by a river [Pascal] |
6677 | Imagination creates beauty, justice and happiness, which is the supreme good [Pascal] |
6678 | We live for the past or future, and so are never happy in the present [Pascal] |
20732 | If man considers himself as lost and imprisoned in the universe, he will be terrified [Pascal] |
6682 | Majority opinion is visible and authoritative, although not very clever [Pascal] |
6679 | It is not good to be too free [Pascal] |
7455 | Pascal knows you can't force belief, but you can make it much more probable [Pascal, by Hacking] |
7457 | Pascal is right, but relies on the unsupported claim of a half as the chance of God's existence [Hacking on Pascal] |
7456 | The libertine would lose a life of enjoyable sin if he chose the cloisters [Hacking on Pascal] |
6684 | If you win the wager on God's existence you win everything, if you lose you lose nothing [Pascal] |