Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM, Anil Seth and Christine M. Korsgaard

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22 ideas

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 3. Levels of Reality
A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow]
The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 8. Brain
Single neurons can carry out complex functions [Seth]
The cerbellum has a huge number of neurons, but little involvement in consciousness [Seth]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / e. Cause of consciousness
Maybe a system is conscious if the whole generates more information than its parts [Seth]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 4. Persons as Agents
A person viewed as an agent makes no sense without its own future [Korsgaard]
To make sense of personal identity, focus on agency rather than experience [Korsgaard]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
The self is embodied, perspectival, volitional, narrative and social [Seth, by PG]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 6. Artificial Thought / a. Artificial Intelligence
Modern AI is mostly machine-based pattern recognition [Seth]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 1. Action Theory
Theory of action focuses on explanation and prediction; practical action on justification and choice [Korsgaard]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
Volition is felt as doing what you want, with possible alternatives, and a source from within [Seth]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
Maybe final value rests on the extrinsic property of being valued by a rational agent [Korsgaard, by Orsi]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / d. Biological ethics
Human exceptionalism plagues biology, and most other human thinking [Seth]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
If we can't reason about value, we can reason about the unconditional source of value [Korsgaard]
An end can't be an ultimate value just because it is useless! [Korsgaard]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / i. Self-interest
Self-concern may be a source of pain, or a lack of self-respect, or a failure of responsibility [Korsgaard]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
Goodness is given either by a psychological state, or the attribution of a property [Korsgaard]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
Personal concern for one's own self widens out into concern for the impersonal [Korsgaard]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / g. Contemplation
Contemplation is final because it is an activity which is not a process [Korsgaard]
For Aristotle, contemplation consists purely of understanding [Korsgaard]