19 ideas
10365 | We might use 'facta' to refer to the truth-makers for facts [Mellor, by Schaffer,J] |
16062 | A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16061 | If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16060 | Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16064 | The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow] |
8568 | A property is merely a constituent of laws of nature; temperature is just part of thermodynamics [Mellor] |
8564 | There is obviously a possible predicate for every property [Mellor] |
8566 | We need universals for causation and laws of nature; the latter give them their identity [Mellor] |
8565 | If properties were just the meanings of predicates, they couldn't give predicates their meaning [Mellor] |
23513 | Single neurons can carry out complex functions [Seth] |
23514 | The cerbellum has a huge number of neurons, but little involvement in consciousness [Seth] |
23516 | Maybe a system is conscious if the whole generates more information than its parts [Seth] |
23519 | The self is embodied, perspectival, volitional, narrative and social [Seth, by PG] |
23518 | Modern AI is mostly machine-based pattern recognition [Seth] |
23517 | Volition is felt as doing what you want, with possible alternatives, and a source from within [Seth] |
23515 | Human exceptionalism plagues biology, and most other human thinking [Seth] |
4785 | Causal statements relate facts (which are whatever true propositions express) [Mellor, by Psillos] |
8567 | Singular causation requires causes to raise the physical probability of their effects [Mellor] |
8408 | Probabilistic causation says C is a cause of E if it increases the chances of E occurring [Mellor, by Tooley] |