16 ideas
| 9406 | A class is natural when everybody can spot further members of it [Quinton] |
| 16062 | A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16061 | If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16060 | Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16064 | The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 15730 | Extreme nominalists say all classification is arbitrary convention [Quinton] |
| 15728 | The naturalness of a class depends as much on the observers as on the objects [Quinton] |
| 9407 | Properties imply natural classes which can be picked out by everybody [Quinton] |
| 15729 | Uninstantiated properties must be defined using the instantiated ones [Quinton] |
| 8520 | An individual is a union of a group of qualities and a position [Quinton, by Campbell,K] |
| 12066 | Aristotelian and Kripkean essentialism are very different theories [Witt] |
| 12067 | An Aristotelian essence is a nonlinguistic correlate of the definition [Witt] |
| 12082 | If unity is a matter of degree, then essence may also be a matter of degree [Witt] |
| 12089 | Essences mainly explain the existence of unified substance [Witt] |
| 12102 | Essential properties of origin are too radically individual for an Aristotelian essence [Witt] |
| 12085 | Reality is directional [Witt] |