25 ideas
12772 | Philosophy is a value- and attitude-driven enterprise [Fraassen] |
12771 | Is it likely that a successful, coherent, explanatory ontological hypothesis is true? [Fraassen] |
12773 | Analytic philosophy has an exceptional arsenal of critical tools [Fraassen] |
12770 | We may end up with a huge theory of carefully constructed falsehoods [Fraassen] |
16062 | A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16061 | If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16060 | Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16064 | The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow] |
14919 | Empiricists deny what is unobservable, and reject objective modality [Fraassen] |
3756 | Perception, introspection, testimony, memory, reason, and inference can give us knowledge [Bernecker/Dretske] |
6783 | To 'accept' a theory is not to believe it, but to believe it empirically adequate [Fraassen, by Bird] |
3757 | Causal theory says true perceptions must be caused by the object perceived [Bernecker/Dretske] |
3759 | You can acquire new knowledge by exploring memories [Bernecker/Dretske] |
3752 | Justification can be of the belief, or of the person holding the belief [Bernecker/Dretske] |
3753 | Foundationalism aims to avoid an infinite regress [Bernecker/Dretske] |
3754 | Infallible sensations can't be foundations if they are non-epistemic [Bernecker/Dretske] |
3755 | Justification is normative, so it can't be reduced to cognitive psychology [Bernecker/Dretske] |
3761 | Modern arguments against the sceptic are epistemological and semantic externalism, and the focus on relevance [Bernecker/Dretske] |
14917 | To accept a scientific theory, we only need to believe that it is empirically adequate [Fraassen] |
3760 | Predictions are bound to be arbitrary if they depend on the language used [Bernecker/Dretske] |
6784 | Why should the true explanation be one of the few we have actually thought of? [Fraassen, by Bird] |
12769 | Inference to best explanation contains all sorts of hidden values [Fraassen] |
13066 | An explanation is just descriptive information answering a particular question [Fraassen, by Salmon] |
12768 | We accept many scientific theories without endorsing them as true [Fraassen] |
3758 | Semantic externalism ties content to the world, reducing error [Bernecker/Dretske] |