Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM, Bas C. van Fraassen and Jerrold J. Katz

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24 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
2510 Traditionally philosophy is an a priori enquiry into general truths about reality [Katz]
2516 Most of philosophy begins where science leaves off [Katz]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
12772 Philosophy is a value- and attitude-driven enterprise [Fraassen]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 2. Possibility of Metaphysics
12771 Is it likely that a successful, coherent, explanatory ontological hypothesis is true? [Fraassen]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 1. Nature of Analysis
12773 Analytic philosophy has an exceptional arsenal of critical tools [Fraassen]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
12770 We may end up with a huge theory of carefully constructed falsehoods [Fraassen]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / b. Against mathematical platonism
2521 'Real' maths objects have no causal role, no determinate reference, and no abstract/concrete distinction [Katz]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 3. Levels of Reality
16062 A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
16061 If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
16060 Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow]
16064 The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
14919 Empiricists deny what is unobservable, and reject objective modality [Fraassen]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
6783 To 'accept' a theory is not to believe it, but to believe it empirically adequate [Fraassen, by Bird]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 5. A Priori Synthetic
2513 We don't have a clear enough sense of meaning to pronounce some sentences meaningless or just analytic [Katz]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
2522 Experience cannot teach us why maths and logic are necessary [Katz]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 2. Aim of Science
14917 To accept a scientific theory, we only need to believe that it is empirically adequate [Fraassen]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / c. Against best explanation
6784 Why should the true explanation be one of the few we have actually thought of? [Fraassen, by Bird]
12769 Inference to best explanation contains all sorts of hidden values [Fraassen]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 4. Explanation Doubts / a. Explanation as pragmatic
13066 An explanation is just descriptive information answering a particular question [Fraassen, by Salmon]
12768 We accept many scientific theories without endorsing them as true [Fraassen]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
2517 Structuralists see meaning behaviouristically, and Chomsky says nothing about it [Katz]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / a. Sense and reference
2519 It is generally accepted that sense is defined as the determiner of reference [Katz]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 5. Fregean Semantics
2520 Sense determines meaning and synonymy, not referential properties like denotation and truth [Katz]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense
2518 Sentences are abstract types (like musical scores), not individual tokens [Katz]