81 ideas
16604 | Philosophy consists of choosing between Plato, Aristotle and Democritus [Pasnau] |
16606 | Original philosophers invariably seek inspiration from past thinkers [Pasnau] |
16586 | The commentaries of Averroes were the leading guide to Aristotle [Pasnau] |
16568 | Modernity begins in the late 12th century, with Averroes's commentaries on Aristotle [Pasnau] |
16653 | Once accidents were seen as real, 'Categories' became the major text for ontology [Pasnau] |
16704 | In 1347, the Church effectively stopped philosophy for the next 300 years [Pasnau] |
16605 | After c.1450 all of Plato was available. Before that, only the first half of 'Timaeus' was known [Pasnau] |
16607 | Renaissance Platonism is peripheral [Pasnau] |
16715 | Plato only made an impact locally in 15th century Italy [Pasnau] |
16610 | Philosophy could easily have died in 17th century, if it weren't for Descartes [Pasnau] |
16781 | The 17th century is a metaphysical train wreck [Pasnau] |
16677 | Anti-Razor: if you can't account for a truth, keep positing things until you can [Pasnau] |
16598 | Priority was a major topic of dispute for scholastics [Pasnau] |
16062 | A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16061 | If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16727 | In mixtures, the four elements ceased to exist, replaced by a mixed body with a form [Pasnau] |
16060 | Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16064 | The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16661 | There are two sorts of category - referring to things, and to circumstances of things [Boethius] |
16732 | 17th C qualities are either microphysical, or phenomenal, or powers [Pasnau] |
16733 | 17th century authors only recognised categorical properties, never dispositions [Pasnau] |
16662 | The biggest question for scholastics is whether properties are real, or modes of substances [Pasnau] |
16767 | There is no centralised power, but we still need essence for a metaphysical understanding [Pasnau] |
16788 | Instead of adding Aristotelian forms to physical stuff, one could add dispositions [Pasnau] |
16738 | Scholastics reject dispositions, because they are not actual, as forms require [Pasnau] |
15035 | If universals are not separate, we can isolate them by abstraction [Boethius, by Panaccio] |
16649 | Scholastics say there is a genuine thing if it is 'separable' [Pasnau] |
16785 | If you reject essences, questions of individuation become extremely difficult [Pasnau] |
16680 | Scholastics thought Quantity could be the principle of individuation [Pasnau] |
14665 | We can call the quality of Plato 'Platonity', and say it is a quality which only he possesses [Boethius] |
16617 | Corpuscularian critics of scholasticism say only substances exist [Pasnau] |
16741 | Scholastics wanted to treat Aristotelianism as physics, rather than as metaphysics [Pasnau] |
16777 | If crowds are things at all, they seem to be Substances, since they bear properties [Pasnau] |
16628 | Corpuscularianism promised a decent account of substance [Pasnau] |
16615 | Scholastics use 'substantia' for thick concrete entities, and for thin metaphysical ones [Pasnau] |
16775 | For corpuscularians, a substance is just its integral parts [Pasnau] |
16769 | If clay survives destruction of the statue, the statue wasn't a substance, but a mere accident [Pasnau] |
16602 | Corpuscularianism rejected not only form, but also the dependence of matter on form [Pasnau] |
16612 | Hylomorphism may not be a rival to science, but an abstract account of unity and endurance [Pasnau] |
16613 | Hylomorphism declined because scholastics made it into a testable physical theory [Pasnau] |
16747 | Scholastics made forms substantial, in a way unintended by Aristotle [Pasnau] |
16759 | Scholastics began to see substantial form more as Aristotle's 'efficient' cause [Pasnau] |
16748 | Aquinas says a substance has one form; Scotists say it has many forms [Pasnau] |
16671 | Scholastic Quantity either gives a body parts, or spreads them out in a unified way [Pasnau] |
16579 | There may be different types of substrate, or temporary substrates [Pasnau] |
16596 | A substratum can't be 'bare', because it has a job to do [Pasnau] |
16584 | If a substrate gives causal support for change, quite a lot of the ingredients must endure [Pasnau] |
16580 | A substrate may be 'prime matter', which endures through every change [Pasnau] |
16749 | Aristotelians deny that all necessary properties are essential [Pasnau] |
16694 | Typical successive things are time and motion [Pasnau] |
16583 | Weak ex nihilo says it all comes from something; strong version says the old must partly endure [Pasnau] |
23308 | Reasoning relates to understanding as time does to eternity [Boethius, by Sorabji] |
16783 | Essences must explain, so we can infer them causally from the accidents [Pasnau] |
5771 | Knowledge of present events doesn't make them necessary, so future events are no different [Boethius] |
5767 | Rational natures require free will, in order to have power of judgement [Boethius] |
5768 | God's universal foreknowledge seems opposed to free will [Boethius] |
5769 | Does foreknowledge cause necessity, or necessity cause foreknowledge? [Boethius] |
5762 | The wicked want goodness, so they would not be wicked if they obtained it [Boethius] |
5770 | Rewards and punishments are not deserved if they don't arise from free movement of the mind [Boethius] |
5764 | When people fall into wickedness they lose their human nature [Boethius] |
5756 | Happiness is a good which once obtained leaves nothing more to be desired [Boethius] |
5763 | The bad seek the good through desire, but the good through virtue, which is more natural [Boethius] |
5759 | Varied aims cannot be good because they differ, but only become good when they unify [Boethius] |
5754 | You can't control someone's free mind, only their body and possessions [Boethius] |
16609 | Atomists say causation is mechanical collisions, and all true qualities are microscopic [Pasnau] |
16603 | In the 17th C matter became body, and was then studied by science [Pasnau] |
16592 | Atomism is the commonest version of corpuscularianism, but isn't required by it [Pasnau] |
16750 | If there are just arrangements of corpuscles, where are the boundaries between substances? [Pasnau] |
16722 | Scholastic causation is by changes in the primary qualities of hot, cold, wet, dry [Pasnau] |
16760 | Substantial forms were a step towards scientific essentialism [Pasnau] |
16581 | Scholastic authors agree that matter was created by God, out of nothing [Pasnau] |
16692 | Divine eternity is the all-at-once and complete possession of unending life [Boethius] |
5752 | Where does evil come from if there is a god; where does good come from if there isn't? [Boethius] |
5758 | God is the good [Boethius] |
5757 | God is the supreme good, so no source of goodness could take precedence over God [Boethius] |
5760 | The power through which creation remains in existence and motion I call 'God' [Boethius] |
5753 | The regular events of this life could never be due to chance [Boethius] |
16642 | Transubstantion says accidents of bread and wine don't inhere in the substance [Pasnau] |
5765 | The reward of the good is to become gods [Boethius] |
5761 | God can do anything, but he cannot do evil, so evil must be nothing [Boethius] |
5766 | If you could see the plan of Providence, you would not think there was evil anywhere [Boethius] |