31 ideas
7791 | The simplest of the logics based on possible worlds is Lewis's S5 [Lewis,CI, by Girle] |
9358 | There are several logics, none of which will ever derive falsehoods from truth [Lewis,CI] |
9357 | Excluded middle is just our preference for a simplified dichotomy in experience [Lewis,CI] |
9364 | Names represent a uniformity in experience, or they name nothing [Lewis,CI] |
16062 | A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16061 | If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16060 | Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16064 | The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow] |
11002 | Equating necessity with informal provability is the S4 conception of necessity [Lewis,CI, by Read] |
9362 | Necessary truths are those we will maintain no matter what [Lewis,CI] |
7803 | Modal logic began with translation difficulties for 'If...then' [Lewis,CI, by Girle] |
9365 | We can maintain a priori principles come what may, but we can also change them [Lewis,CI] |
21500 | We rely on memory for empirical beliefs because they mutually support one another [Lewis,CI] |
21501 | If we doubt memories we cannot assess our doubt, or what is being doubted [Lewis,CI] |
6556 | If anything is to be probable, then something must be certain [Lewis,CI] |
21498 | Congruents assertions increase the probability of each individual assertion in the set [Lewis,CI] |
5828 | Extension is the class of things, intension is the correct definition of the thing, and intension determines extension [Lewis,CI] |
9361 | We have to separate the mathematical from physical phenomena by abstraction [Lewis,CI] |
4761 | The 'error theory' of morals says there is no moral knowledge, because there are no moral facts [Mackie, by Engel] |
8337 | Some says mental causation is distinct because we can recognise single occurrences [Mackie] |
8342 | Mackie tries to analyse singular causal statements, but his entities are too vague for events [Kim on Mackie] |
8343 | Necessity and sufficiency are best suited to properties and generic events, not individual events [Kim on Mackie] |
8385 | A cause is part of a wider set of conditions which suffices for its effect [Mackie, by Crane] |
8335 | Necessary conditions are like counterfactuals, and sufficient conditions are like factual conditionals [Mackie] |
8336 | The INUS account interprets single events, and sequences, causally, without laws being known [Mackie] |
8333 | A cause is an Insufficient but Necessary part of an Unnecessary but Sufficient condition [Mackie] |
8395 | Mackie has a nomological account of general causes, and a subjunctive conditional account of single ones [Mackie, by Tooley] |
8334 | The virus causes yellow fever, and is 'the' cause; sweets cause tooth decay, but they are not 'the' cause [Mackie] |
9363 | Science seeks classification which will discover laws, essences, and predictions [Lewis,CI] |
1472 | The propositions that God is good and omnipotent, and that evil exists, are logically contradictory [Mackie, by PG] |
1473 | Is evil an illusion, or a necessary contrast, or uncontrollable, or necessary for human free will? [Mackie, by PG] |