17 ideas
8368 | A correct definition is what can be substituted without loss of meaning [Ducasse] |
16062 | A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16061 | If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16060 | Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16064 | The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow] |
19743 | A notebook counts as memory, if is available to consciousness and guides our actions [Clark/Chalmers] |
6176 | A mechanism can count as 'cognitive' whether it is in the brain or outside it [Clark/Chalmers, by Rowlands] |
19741 | If something in the world could equally have been a mental process, it is part of our cognition [Clark/Chalmers] |
19742 | Consciousness may not extend beyond the head, but cognition need not be conscious [Clark/Chalmers] |
19744 | If a person relies on their notes, those notes are parted of the extended system which is the person [Clark/Chalmers] |
8367 | Causation is defined in terms of a single sequence, and constant conjunction is no part of it [Ducasse] |
8372 | We see what is in common between causes to assign names to them, not to perceive them [Ducasse] |
8369 | Causes are either sufficient, or necessary, or necessitated, or contingent upon [Ducasse] |
8373 | When a brick and a canary-song hit a window, we ignore the canary if we are interested in the breakage [Ducasse] |
8370 | A cause is a change which occurs close to the effect and just before it [Ducasse] |
8371 | Recurrence is only relevant to the meaning of law, not to the meaning of cause [Ducasse] |
8374 | We are interested in generalising about causes and effects purely for practical purposes [Ducasse] |