22 ideas
8368 | A correct definition is what can be substituted without loss of meaning [Ducasse] |
16062 | A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16061 | If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16060 | Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16064 | The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow] |
8239 | If the King likes music then there is hope for the state [Mengzi (Mencius)] |
23398 | Human nature is naturally compassionate and good (as a 'sprout'), but people may not be good [Mengzi (Mencius), by Norden] |
23400 | Righteousness is extending the unthinkable, to reveal what must be done [Mengzi (Mencius)] |
23399 | Each correct feeling relies on an underlying virtue [Mengzi (Mencius)] |
8235 | Should a coward who ran fifty paces from a battle laugh at another who ran a hundred? [Mengzi (Mencius)] |
8240 | A true king shares his pleasure with the people [Mengzi (Mencius)] |
8237 | Extend the treatment of the old and young in your family to the rest of society [Mengzi (Mencius)] |
8241 | Only put someone to death if the whole population believes it is deserved [Mengzi (Mencius)] |
8238 | Seeking peace through war is like looking for fish up a tree [Mengzi (Mencius)] |
8236 | Avoid the animals you are going to eat, as it is hard once you have got to know them [Mengzi (Mencius)] |
8367 | Causation is defined in terms of a single sequence, and constant conjunction is no part of it [Ducasse] |
8372 | We see what is in common between causes to assign names to them, not to perceive them [Ducasse] |
8369 | Causes are either sufficient, or necessary, or necessitated, or contingent upon [Ducasse] |
8373 | When a brick and a canary-song hit a window, we ignore the canary if we are interested in the breakage [Ducasse] |
8370 | A cause is a change which occurs close to the effect and just before it [Ducasse] |
8371 | Recurrence is only relevant to the meaning of law, not to the meaning of cause [Ducasse] |
8374 | We are interested in generalising about causes and effects purely for practical purposes [Ducasse] |