11 ideas
| 16062 | A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16061 | If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16060 | Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16064 | The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 10496 | Monothetic categories have fixed defining features, and polythetic categories do not [Ellen] |
| 10497 | In symbolic classification, the categories are linked to rules [Ellen] |
| 10494 | Several words may label a category; one word can name several categories; some categories lack words [Ellen] |
| 10495 | Continuous experience sometimes needs imposition of boundaries to create categories [Ellen] |
| 10498 | Classification is no longer held to be rooted in social institutions [Ellen] |
| 8406 | Not all explanations are causal, but if a thing can be explained at all, it can be explained causally [Sanford] |
| 8407 | A totality of conditions necessary for an occurrence is usually held to be jointly sufficient for it [Sanford] |