28 ideas
| 10653 | Maybe set theory need not be well-founded [Varzi] |
| 10648 | Mereology need not be nominalist, though it is often taken to be so [Varzi] |
| 10655 | Are there mereological atoms, and are all objects made of them? [Varzi] |
| 10659 | There is something of which everything is part, but no null-thing which is part of everything [Varzi] |
| 11970 | Logicians like their entities to exhibit a maximum degree of purity [Kaplan] |
| 11989 | For Russell, expressions dependent on contingent circumstances must be eliminated [Kaplan] |
| 16062 | A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16061 | If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16060 | Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16064 | The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 10661 | 'Composition is identity' says multitudes are the reality, loosely composing single things [Varzi] |
| 11969 | Models nicely separate particulars from their clothing, and logicians often accept that metaphysically [Kaplan] |
| 10647 | Parts may or may not be attached, demarcated, arbitrary, material, extended, spatial or temporal [Varzi] |
| 10651 | If 'part' is reflexive, then identity is a limit case of parthood [Varzi] |
| 10649 | 'Part' stands for a reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive relation [Varzi] |
| 10654 | The parthood relation will help to define at least seven basic predicates [Varzi] |
| 10658 | Sameness of parts won't guarantee identity if their arrangement matters [Varzi] |
| 10652 | Conceivability may indicate possibility, but literary fantasy does not [Varzi] |
| 11971 | The simplest solution to transworld identification is to adopt bare particulars [Kaplan] |
| 11973 | Unusual people may have no counterparts, or several [Kaplan] |
| 11972 | Essence is a transworld heir line, rather than a collection of properties [Kaplan] |
| 11990 | 'Haecceitism' says that sameness or difference of individuals is independent of appearances [Kaplan] |
| 9668 | 'Haecceitism' is common thisness under dissimilarity, or distinct thisnesses under resemblance [Kaplan] |
| 11991 | If quantification into modal contexts is legitimate, that seems to imply some form of haecceitism [Kaplan] |
| 11967 | Sentences might have the same sense when logically equivalent - or never have the same sense [Kaplan] |
| 14080 | Are causal descriptions part of the causal theory of reference, or are they just metasemantic? [Kaplan, by Schaffer,J] |
| 14894 | Indexicals have a 'character' (the standing meaning), and a 'content' (truth-conditions for one context) [Kaplan, by Macià/Garcia-Carpentiro] |
| 14700 | 'Content' gives the standard modal profile, and 'character' gives rules for a context [Kaplan, by Schroeter] |