7 ideas
16062 | A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16061 | If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16060 | Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16064 | The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow] |
15391 | A substance is, roughly, a basic being or subject at the foundation of reality [Robb] |
15392 | If an object survives the loss of a part, complex objects can have autonomy over their parts [Robb] |
15143 | Kind essences are the categorical bases of a thing's causal powers [Bhaskar, by Chakravartty] |