148 ideas
11832 | We learn a concept's relations by using it, without reducing it to anything [Wiggins] |
16512 | Semantic facts are preferable to transcendental philosophical fiction [Wiggins] |
11863 | (λx)[Man x] means 'the property x has iff x is a man'. [Wiggins] |
17529 | Maybe the concept needed under which things coincide must also yield a principle of counting [Wiggins] |
17530 | The sortal needed for identities may not always be sufficient to support counting [Wiggins] |
14746 | What exists can't depend on our conceptual scheme, and using all conceptual schemes is too liberal [Sider on Wiggins] |
16062 | A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16061 | If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16523 | Realist Conceptualists accept that our interests affect our concepts [Wiggins] |
16524 | Conceptualism says we must use our individuating concepts to grasp reality [Wiggins] |
16060 | Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16064 | The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16526 | Animal classifications: the Emperor's, fabulous, innumerable, like flies, stray dogs, embalmed…. [Wiggins] |
12056 | An ancestral relation is either direct or transitively indirect [Wiggins] |
12050 | Substances contain a source of change or principle of activity [Wiggins] |
16492 | Individuation needs accounts of identity, of change, and of singling out [Wiggins] |
16493 | Individuation can only be understood by the relation between things and thinkers [Wiggins] |
11900 | We can accept criteria of distinctness and persistence, without making the counterfactual claims [Mackie,P on Wiggins] |
11870 | Activity individuates natural things, functions do artefacts, and intentions do artworks [Wiggins] |
16496 | Singling out extends back and forward in time [Wiggins] |
11866 | The idea of 'thisness' is better expressed with designation/predication and particular/universal [Wiggins] |
12052 | We never single out just 'this', but always 'this something-or-other' [Wiggins] |
13128 | 'Ultimate sortals' cannot explain ontological categories [Westerhoff on Wiggins] |
16495 | The only singling out is singling out 'as' something [Wiggins] |
16501 | In Aristotle's sense, saying x falls under f is to say what x is [Wiggins] |
16506 | Every determinate thing falls under a sortal, which fixes its persistence [Wiggins] |
12055 | Sortal predications are answers to the question 'what is x?' [Wiggins] |
12059 | A river may change constantly, but not in respect of being a river [Wiggins] |
12063 | Sortal classification becomes science, with cross reference clarifying individuals [Wiggins] |
12051 | If the kinds are divided realistically, they fall into substances [Wiggins] |
12053 | 'Human being' is a better answer to 'what is it?' than 'poet', as the latter comes in degrees [Wiggins] |
12054 | Secondary substances correctly divide primary substances by activity-principles and relations [Wiggins] |
11896 | A sortal essence is a thing's principle of individuation [Wiggins, by Mackie,P] |
15835 | Wiggins's sortal essentialism rests on a thing's principle of individuation [Wiggins, by Mackie,P] |
11841 | The evening star is the same planet but not the same star as the morning star, since it is not a star [Wiggins] |
10679 | 'Sortalism' says parts only compose a whole if it falls under a sort or kind [Wiggins, by Hossack] |
14363 | Identity a=b is only possible with some concept to give persistence and existence conditions [Wiggins, by Strawson,P] |
14364 | A thing is necessarily its highest sortal kind, which entails an essential constitution [Wiggins, by Strawson,P] |
11851 | Many predicates are purely generic, or pure determiners, rather than sortals [Wiggins] |
11865 | The possibility of a property needs an essential sortal concept to conceive it [Wiggins] |
12047 | We refer to persisting substances, in perception and in thought, and they aid understanding [Wiggins] |
14744 | Objects can only coincide if they are of different kinds; trees can't coincide with other trees [Wiggins, by Sider] |
11852 | Is the Pope's crown one crown, if it is made of many crowns? [Wiggins] |
11875 | Boundaries are not crucial to mountains, so they are determinate without a determinate extent [Wiggins] |
12057 | Matter underlies things, composes things, and brings them to be [Wiggins] |
14749 | Identity is an atemporal relation, but composition is relative to times [Wiggins, by Sider] |
11844 | If I destroy an item, I do not destroy each part of it [Wiggins] |
11861 | We can forget about individual or particularized essences [Wiggins] |
16509 | Natural kinds are well suited to be the sortals which fix substances [Wiggins] |
11871 | Essences are not explanations, but individuations [Wiggins] |
11879 | Essentialism is best represented as a predicate-modifier: □(a exists → a is F) [Wiggins, by Mackie,P] |
16514 | Artefacts are individuated by some matter having a certain function [Wiggins] |
16510 | Nominal essences don't fix membership, ignore evolution, and aren't contextual [Wiggins] |
11835 | The nominal essence is the idea behind a name used for sorting [Wiggins] |
16503 | 'What is it?' gives the kind, nature, persistence conditions and identity over time of a thing [Wiggins] |
11876 | It is easier to go from horses to horse-stages than from horse-stages to horses [Wiggins] |
16499 | A restored church is the same 'church', but not the same 'building' or 'brickwork' [Wiggins] |
16515 | A thing begins only once; for a clock, it is when its making is first completed [Wiggins] |
11858 | The question is not what gets the title 'Theseus' Ship', but what is identical with the original [Wiggins] |
16517 | Priests prefer the working ship; antiquarians prefer the reconstruction [Wiggins] |
11843 | Identity over a time and at a time aren't different concepts [Wiggins] |
11864 | Hesperus=Hesperus, and Phosphorus=Hesperus, so necessarily Phosphorus=Hesperus [Wiggins] |
16498 | Identity cannot be defined, because definitions are identities [Wiggins] |
11831 | The formal properties of identity are reflexivity and Leibniz's Law [Wiggins] |
16497 | Leibniz's Law (not transitivity, symmetry, reflexivity) marks what is peculiar to identity [Wiggins] |
16502 | Identity is primitive [Wiggins] |
14362 | Relative Identity is incompatible with the Indiscernibility of Identicals [Wiggins, by Strawson,P] |
11838 | Relativity of Identity makes identity entirely depend on a category [Wiggins] |
11847 | To identify two items, we must have a common sort for them [Wiggins] |
16521 | A is necessarily A, so if B is A, then B is also necessarily A [Wiggins] |
16505 | By the principle of Indiscernibility, a symmetrical object could only be half of itself! [Wiggins] |
11839 | Do both 'same f as' and '=' support Leibniz's Law? [Wiggins] |
11845 | Substitutivity, and hence most reasoning, needs Leibniz's Law [Wiggins] |
16494 | We want to explain sameness as coincidence of substance, not as anything qualitative [Wiggins] |
16522 | It is hard or impossible to think of Caesar as not human [Wiggins] |
11869 | Possible worlds rest on the objects about which we have suppositions [Wiggins] |
11850 | Not every story corresponds to a possible world [Wiggins] |
16525 | Our sortal concepts fix what we find in experience [Wiggins] |
12064 | The category of substance is more important for epistemology than for ontology [Wiggins] |
12049 | Naming the secondary substance provides a mass of general information [Wiggins] |
11848 | Asking 'what is it?' nicely points us to the persistence of a continuing entity [Wiggins] |
12065 | Seeing a group of soldiers as an army is irresistible, in ontology and explanation [Wiggins] |
18658 | The 'Kantian' self steps back from commitment to its social situation [Kymlicka] |
11859 | The mind conceptualizes objects; yet objects impinge upon the mind [Wiggins] |
16518 | We conceptualise objects, but they impinge on us [Wiggins] |
11836 | We can use 'concept' for the reference, and 'conception' for sense [Wiggins] |
16511 | A 'conception' of a horse is a full theory of what it is (and not just the 'concept') [Wiggins] |
18650 | Teleological theories give the good priority over concern for people [Kymlicka] |
18664 | Maybe the particularist moral thought of women is better than the impartial public thinking of men [Kymlicka] |
18624 | Utilitarianism is not a decision-procedure; choice of the best procedure is an open question [Kymlicka] |
18626 | One view says start with equality, and infer equal weight to interests, and hence maximum utility [Kymlicka] |
18627 | A second view says start with maximising the good, implying aggregation, and hence equality [Kymlicka] |
18625 | To maximise utility should we double the population, even if life somewhat deteriorates? [Kymlicka] |
18638 | The difference principles says we must subsidise the costs of other people's choices [Kymlicka] |
23418 | Liberal state legitimacy is based on a belief in justice, not in some conception of the good life [Kymlicka] |
18635 | Social contract theories are usually rejected because there never was such a contract [Kymlicka] |
23369 | Some liberals thinks checks and balances are enough, without virtuous citizens [Kymlicka] |
23370 | Good citizens need civic virtues of loyalty, independence, diligence, respect, etc. [Kymlicka] |
23373 | Liberals accept that people need society, but Aristotelians must show that they need political activity [Kymlicka] |
23375 | Minimal liberal citizenship needs common civility, as well as mere non-interference [Kymlicka] |
23376 | Modern non-discrimination obliges modern citizens to treat each other as equals [Kymlicka] |
23377 | The right wing sees citizenship in terms of responsibility to earn a living, rather than rights [Kymlicka] |
23414 | Liberals say state intervention in culture restricts people's autonomy [Kymlicka] |
18630 | Utilitarianism is no longer a distinctive political position [Kymlicka] |
18623 | The quest of the general good is partly undermined by people's past entitlements [Kymlicka] |
18628 | We shouldn't endorse preferences which reject equality, and show prejudice and selfishness [Kymlicka] |
18629 | Using utilitarian principles to make decisions encourages cold detachment from people [Kymlicka] |
18637 | Utilitarianism is irrational if it tells you to trade in your rights and resources just for benefits [Kymlicka] |
23371 | Modern democratic theory focuses on talk, not votes, because we need consensus or compromise [Kymlicka] |
23390 | In a liberal democracy all subjects of authority have a right to determine the authority [Kymlicka] |
18663 | Modern liberalism has added personal privacy to our personal social lives [Kymlicka] |
23374 | We have become attached to private life because that has become greatly enriched [Kymlicka] |
18632 | Liberalism tends to give priority to basic liberties [Kymlicka] |
22818 | Liberals are not too individualistic, because people recognise and value social relations [Kymlicka] |
23410 | Modern liberals see a community as simply a society which respects freedom and equality [Kymlicka] |
23387 | Liberals must avoid an official culture, as well as an official religion [Kymlicka] |
23388 | Liberals need more than freedom; they must build a nation, through a language and institutions [Kymlicka] |
23380 | Some individuals can gain citizenship as part of a group, rather than as mere individuals [Kymlicka] |
23381 | The status hierarchy is independent of the economic hierarchy [Kymlicka] |
23383 | Some multiculturalists defended the rights of cohesive minorities against liberal individualism [Kymlicka] |
23384 | 'Culturalist' liberals say that even liberal individuals may need minority rights [Kymlicka] |
23385 | Multiculturalism may entail men dominating women in minority groups [Kymlicka] |
23386 | Liberals must prefer minority right which are freedoms, not restrictions [Kymlicka] |
23389 | Why shouldn't national minorities have their own right to nation-build? [Kymlicka] |
23391 | Multiculturalism is liberal if it challenges inequality, conservative if it emphasises common good [Kymlicka] |
18656 | Marxists say liberalism is unjust, because it allows exploitation in the sale of labour [Kymlicka] |
23409 | Community can focus on class or citizenship or ethnicity or culture [Kymlicka] |
18659 | The 'Kantian' view of the self misses the way it is embedded or situated in society [Kymlicka] |
18660 | Communitarians say we should pay more attention to our history [Kymlicka] |
23419 | Communitarianism struggles with excluded marginalised groups [Kymlicka] |
18657 | Communitarian states only encourage fairly orthodox ideas of the good life [Kymlicka] |
23413 | Feminism has shown that social roles are far from fixed (as communitarians tend to see them) [Kymlicka] |
23415 | Participation aids the quest for the good life, but why should that be a state activity? [Kymlicka] |
18649 | If everyone owned himself, that would prevent slavery [Kymlicka] |
18640 | Libertarians like the free market, but they also think that the free market is just [Kymlicka] |
18651 | The most valuable liberties to us need not be the ones with the most freedom [Kymlicka] |
18661 | Ancient freedom was free participation in politics, not private independence of life [Kymlicka] |
18633 | Equal opportunities seems fair, because your fate is from your choices, not your circumstances [Kymlicka] |
18634 | Equal opportunity arbitrarily worries about social circumstances, but ignores talents [Kymlicka] |
18654 | Marxists say justice is unneeded in the truly good community [Kymlicka] |
18652 | The Lockean view of freedom depends on whether you had a right to what is restricted [Kymlicka] |
23379 | Rights are a part of nation-building, to build a common national identity and culture [Kymlicka] |
23382 | Rights derived from group membership are opposed to the idea of state citizenship [Kymlicka] |
18655 | Justice corrects social faults, but also expresses respect to individuals as ends [Kymlicka] |
23411 | Communitarians see justice as primarily a community matter, rather than a principle [Kymlicka] |
23412 | Justice resolves conflicts, but may also provoke them [Kymlicka] |
23378 | The welfare state helps to integrate the working classes into a national culture [Kymlicka] |
11860 | Lawlike propensities are enough to individuate natural kinds [Wiggins] |