Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM, Edmund Husserl and Neil E. Williams

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71 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
Reductive analysis makes a concept clearer, by giving an alternative simpler set [Williams,NE]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 2. Phenomenology
Phenomenology is the science of essences - necessary universal structures for art, representation etc. [Husserl, by Polt]
Bracketing subtracts entailments about external reality from beliefs [Husserl, by Putnam]
Phenomenology aims to describe experience directly, rather than by its origins or causes [Husserl, by Mautner]
Phenomenology studies different types of correlation between consciousness and its objects [Husserl, by Bernet]
Phenomenology needs absolute reflection, without presuppositions [Husserl]
There can only be a science of fluctuating consciousness if it focuses on stable essences [Husserl, by Bernet]
Phenomenology aims to validate objects, on the basis of intentional intuitive experience [Husserl, by Bernet]
Husserl saw transcendental phenomenology as idealist, in its construction of objects [Husserl, by Bernet]
Start philosophising with no preconceptions, from the intuitively non-theoretical self-given [Husserl]
Epoché or 'bracketing' is refraining from judgement, even when some truths are certain [Husserl]
'Bracketing' means no judgements at all about spatio-temporal existence [Husserl]
After everything is bracketed, consciousness still has a unique being of its own [Husserl]
Phenomenology describes consciousness, in the light of pure experiences [Husserl]
If phenomenology is deprived of the synthetic a priori, it is reduced to literature [Benardete,JA on Husserl]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 13. Against Definition
The use of mathematical-style definitions in philosophy is fruitless and harmful [Husserl]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 1. Argument
Promoting an ontology by its implied good metaphysic is an 'argument-by-display' [Williams,NE]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
Logicians presuppose a world, and ignore logic/world connections, so their logic is impure [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol]
Phenomenology grounds logic in subjective experience [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / l. Zero
0 is not a number, as it answers 'how many?' negatively [Husserl, by Dummett]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / a. Units
Multiplicity in general is just one and one and one, etc. [Husserl]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / e. Counting by correlation
Husserl said counting is more basic than Frege's one-one correspondence [Husserl, by Heck]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 1. Foundations for Mathematics
Pure mathematics is the relations between all possible objects, and is thus formal ontology [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
Our goal is to reveal a new hidden region of Being [Husserl]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / h. Dasein (being human)
As a thing and its perception are separated, two modes of Being emerge [Husserl]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
Change exists, it is causal, and it needs an explanation [Williams,NE]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 2. Processes
Processes don't begin or end; they just change direction unexpectedly [Williams,NE]
Processes are either strings of short unchanging states, or continuous and unreducible events [Williams,NE]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 3. Levels of Reality
A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / c. Monads
Husserl sees the ego as a monad, unifying presence, sense and intentional acts [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 1. Ontologies
The status quo is part of what exists, and so needs metaphysical explanation [Williams,NE]
A metaphysic is a set of wider explanations derived from a basic ontology [Williams,NE]
Humeans say properties are passive, possibility is vast, laws are descriptions, causation is weak [Williams,NE]
We shouldn't posit the existence of anything we have a word for [Williams,NE]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
The World is all experiencable objects [Husserl]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
Absolute reality is an absurdity [Husserl]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow]
The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 1. Powers
Powers are 'multi-track' if they can produce a variety of manifestations [Williams,NE]
Every possible state of affairs is written into its originating powers [Williams,NE]
Naming powers is unwise, because that it usually done by a single manifestation [Williams,NE]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
Fundamental physics describes everything in terms of powers [Williams,NE]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 5. Powers and Properties
Rather than pure powers or pure categoricals, I favour basics which are both at once [Williams,NE]
Powers are more complicated than properties which are always on display [Williams,NE]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / b. Dispositions and powers
There are basic powers, which underlie dispositions, potentialities, capacities etc [Williams,NE]
Dispositions are just useful descriptions, which are explained by underlying powers [Williams,NE]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
If objects are property bundles, the properties need combining powers [Williams,NE]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
The sense of anything contingent has a purely apprehensible essence or Eidos [Husserl]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
Imagine an object's properties varying; the ones that won't vary are the essential ones [Husserl, by Vaidya]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 4. Four-Dimensionalism
Four-Dimensional is Perdurantism (temporal parts), plus Eternalism [Williams,NE]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 4. The Cogito
The physical given, unlike the mental given, could be non-existing [Husserl]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence
Husserl says we have intellectual intuitions (of categories), as well as of the senses [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol]
Feelings of self-evidence (and necessity) are just the inventions of theory [Husserl]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
Direct 'seeing' by consciousness is the ultimate rational legitimation [Husserl]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
The phenomena of memory are given in the present, but as being past [Husserl, by Bernet]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
Natural science has become great by just ignoring ancient scepticism [Husserl]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / c. Knowing other minds
We know another's mind via bodily expression, while also knowing it is inaccessible [Husserl, by Bernet]
Husserl's monads (egos) communicate, through acts of empathy. [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / b. Essence of consciousness
Pure consciousness is a sealed off system of actual Being [Husserl]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
Husserl identifies a positive mental act of unification, and a negative mental act for differences [Husserl, by Frege]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self
The psychological ego is worldly, and the pure ego follows transcendental reduction [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
We never meet the Ego, as part of experience, or as left over from experience [Husserl]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / b. Analysis of concepts
We clarify concepts (e.g. numbers) by determining their psychological origin [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 8. Abstractionism Critique
Psychologism blunders in focusing on concept-formation instead of delineating the concepts [Dummett on Husserl]
Husserl wanted to keep a shadowy remnant of abstracted objects, to correlate them [Dummett on Husserl]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
Only facts follow from facts [Husserl]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
Causation needs to explain stasis, as well as change [Williams,NE]
Causation is the exercise of powers [Williams,NE]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
If causes and effects overlap, that makes changes impossible [Williams,NE]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / c. Essence and laws
Powers contain lawlike features, pointing to possible future states [Williams,NE]