18 ideas
| 5182 | Claims about 'the Absolute' are not even verifiable in principle [Ayer on Bradley] |
| 6864 | Metaphysics is finding bad reasons for instinctive beliefs [Bradley] |
| 18009 | Chomsky established the view that category mistakes are well-formed but meaningless [Chomsky, by Magidor] |
| 10999 | Names need a means of reidentifying their referents [Bradley, by Read] |
| 16062 | A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16061 | If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16060 | Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16064 | The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 6422 | Internal relations are said to be intrinsic properties of two terms, and of the whole they compose [Bradley, by Russell] |
| 7966 | Relations must be linked to their qualities, but that implies an infinite regress of relations [Bradley] |
| 6404 | British Idealists said reality is a single Mind which experiences itself [Bradley, by Grayling] |
| 22299 | Bradley's objective idealism accepts reality (the Absolute), but says we can't fully describe it [Bradley, by Potter] |
| 21343 | Qualities and relations are mere appearance; the Absolute is a single undifferentiated substance [Bradley, by Heil] |
| 6649 | Chomsky now says concepts are basically innate, as well as syntax [Chomsky, by Lowe] |
| 18007 | Syntax is independent of semantics; sentences can be well formed but meaningless [Chomsky, by Magidor] |
| 18006 | Chomsky's 'interpretative semantics' says syntax comes first, and is then interpreted [Chomsky, by Magidor] |
| 5655 | Happiness is not satisfaction of desires, but fulfilment of values [Bradley, by Scruton] |
| 6406 | Reality is one, because plurality implies relations, and they assert a superior unity [Bradley] |