7 ideas
16030 | 'Nominal' definitions identify things, but fail to give their essence [Jones,J-E] |
16062 | A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16061 | If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16060 | Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16064 | The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow] |
3364 | All mental phenomena contain an object [Brentano] |
3225 | Mental unity suggests that qualia and intentionality must connect [Brentano, by Rey] |