Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM, Fraser MacBride and Jean-Paul Sartre

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these philosophers


86 ideas

1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 2. Phenomenology
Phenomenology assumes that all consciousness is of something [Sartre]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
We might define truth as arising from the truth-maker relation [MacBride]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 1. For Truthmakers
Phenomenalists, behaviourists and presentists can't supply credible truth-makers [MacBride]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
If truthmaking is classical entailment, then anything whatsoever makes a necessary truth [MacBride]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 3. Truthmaker Maximalism
'Maximalism' says every truth has an actual truthmaker [MacBride]
Maximalism follows Russell, and optimalism (no negative or universal truthmakers) follows Wittgenstein [MacBride]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
The main idea of truth-making is that what a proposition is about is what matters [MacBride]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 6. Making Negative Truths
There are different types of truthmakers for different types of negative truth [MacBride]
There aren't enough positive states out there to support all the negative truths [MacBride]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 8. Making General Truths
Optimalists say that negative and universal are true 'by default' from the positive truths [MacBride]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
Does 'this sentence has no truth-maker' have a truth-maker? Reductio suggests it can't have [MacBride]
Even idealists could accept truthmakers, as mind-dependent [MacBride]
Maybe 'makes true' is not an active verb, but just a formal connective like 'because'? [MacBride]
Truthmaker talk of 'something' making sentences true, which presupposes objectual quantification [MacBride]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
Connectives link sentences without linking their meanings [MacBride]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / c. not
'A is F' may not be positive ('is dead'), and 'A is not-F' may not be negative ('is not blind') [MacBride]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / d. Natural numbers
Numbers are identified by their main properties and relations, involving the successor function [MacBride]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / e. Structuralism critique
For mathematical objects to be positions, positions themselves must exist first [MacBride]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / h. Dasein (being human)
For Sartre there is only being for-itself, or being in-itself (which is beyond experience) [Sartre, by Daigle]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
Maybe it only exists if it is a truthmaker (rather than the value of a variable)? [MacBride]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding
Different types of 'grounding' seem to have no more than a family resemblance relation [MacBride]
Which has priority - 'grounding' or 'truth-making'? [MacBride]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 3. Levels of Reality
A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / d. Logical atoms
Russell allows some complex facts, but Wittgenstein only allows atomic facts [MacBride]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow]
The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
It may be that internal relations like proportion exist, because we directly perceive it [MacBride]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 2. Internal Relations
Internal relations are fixed by existences, or characters, or supervenience on characters [MacBride]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 4. Formal Relations / a. Types of relation
'Multigrade' relations are those lacking a fixed number of relata [MacBride]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
Wittgenstein's plan to show there is only logical necessity failed, because of colours [MacBride]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 5. Cogito Critique
The Cogito depends on a second-order experience, of being conscious of consciousness [Sartre]
The consciousness that says 'I think' is not the consciousness that thinks [Sartre]
Is the Cogito reporting an immediate experience of doubting, or the whole enterprise of doubting? [Sartre]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
Appearances do not hide the essence; appearances are the essence [Sartre]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / b. Scepticism of other minds
A consciousness can conceive of no other consciousness than itself [Sartre]
We can never, even in principle, grasp other minds, because the Ego is self-conceiving [Sartre]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 5. Unity of Mind
The eternal truth of 2+2=4 is what gives unity to the mind which regularly thinks it [Sartre]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / b. Essence of consciousness
Consciousness always transcends itself [Sartre]
Sartre says consciousness is just directedness towards external objects [Sartre, by Rowlands]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / f. Higher-order thought
Consciousness exists as consciousness of itself [Sartre]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 2. Unconscious Mind
Since we are a consciousness, Sartre entirely rejected the unconscious mind [Sartre, by Daigle]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality
Intentionality defines, transcends and unites consciousness [Sartre]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 4. Persons as Agents
Man is nothing else but the sum of his actions [Sartre]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self
If you think of '2+2=4' as the content of thought, the self must be united transcendentally [Sartre]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 6. Self as Higher Awareness
The Ego is not formally or materially part of consciousness, but is outside in the world [Sartre]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
How could two I's, the reflective and the reflected, communicate with each other? [Sartre]
Knowing yourself requires an exterior viewpoint, which is necessarily false [Sartre]
My ego is more intimate to me, but not more certain than other egos [Sartre]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
The Ego never appears except when we are not looking for it [Sartre]
When we are unreflective (as when chasing a tram) there is no 'I' [Sartre]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / a. Memory is Self
It is theoretically possible that the Ego consists entirely of false memories [Sartre]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 4. Split Consciousness
If the 'I' is transcendental, it unnecessarily splits consciousness in two [Sartre]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 4. Denial of the Self
Maybe it is the act of reflection that brings 'me' into existence [Sartre]
The Ego only appears to reflection, so it is cut off from the World [Sartre]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
Man IS freedom [Sartre]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / a. Nature of emotions
An emotion and its object form a unity, so emotion is a mode of apprehension [Sartre]
Emotion is one of our modes of understanding our Being-in-the-World [Sartre]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / c. Role of emotions
Emotions are a sort of bodily incantation which brings a magic to the world [Sartre]
Emotions makes us believe in and live in a new world [Sartre]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
Sartre rejects mental content, and the idea that the mind has hidden inner features [Sartre, by Rowlands]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Man is the desire to be God [Sartre]
Man is a useless passion [Sartre]
There is no human nature [Sartre]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
There are no values to justify us, and no excuses [Sartre]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / d. Subjective value
If values depend on us, freedom is the foundation of all values [Sartre]
Sartre's freedom is not for whimsical action, but taking responsibility for our own values [Sartre, by Daigle]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Love is the demand to be loved [Sartre]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
In becoming what we want to be we create what we think man ought to be [Sartre]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / d. Courage
Cowards are responsible for their cowardice [Sartre]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability
When my personal freedom becomes involved, I must want freedom for everyone else [Sartre]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 1. Existentialism
Existentialists says that cowards and heroes make themselves [Sartre]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 3. Angst
Fear concerns the world, but 'anguish' comes from confronting my self [Sartre]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 5. Existence-Essence
Existence before essence (or begin with the subjective) [Sartre]
'Existence precedes essence' means we have no pre-existing self, but create it through existence [Sartre, by Le Poidevin]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 6. Authentic Self
Existentialism says man is whatever he makes of himself [Sartre]
Sincerity is not authenticity, because it only commits to one particular identity [Sartre, by Aho]
We flee from the anguish of freedom by seeing ourselves objectively, as determined [Sartre]
It is dishonest to offer passions as an excuse [Sartre]
Sartre gradually realised that freedom is curtailed by the weight of situation [Sartre, by Daigle]
Authenticity is taking responsibility for a situation, with all its risks and emotions [Sartre]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 7. Existential Action
If I do not choose, that is still a choice [Sartre]
When a man must choose between his mother and the Resistance, no theory can help [Sartre, by Fogelin]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
States have a monopoly of legitimate violence [Sartre, by Wolff,J]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 9. Communism
The truth about events always comes from the oppressed and disadvantaged [Sartre, by Bakewell]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / d. God decrees morality
Without God there is no intelligibility or value [Sartre]