Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM, Friedrich Schelling and Robert Nozick

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37 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
I do not care if my trivial beliefs are false, and I have no interest in many truths [Nozick]
3. Truth / E. Pragmatic Truth / 1. Pragmatic Truth
Maybe James was depicting the value of truth, and not its nature [Nozick]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / c. Becoming
Being is only perceptible to itself as becoming [Schelling]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 3. Levels of Reality
A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow]
The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
Maybe knowledge is belief which 'tracks' the truth [Nozick, by Williams,M]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / d. Absolute idealism
Schelling always affirmed the absolute status of freedom [Schelling, by Courtine]
For Schelling the Absolute spirit manifests as nature in which self-consciousness evolves [Schelling, by Lewis,PB]
Metaphysics aims at the Absolute, which goes beyond subjective and objective viewpoints [Schelling, by Pinkard]
We must show that the whole of nature, because it is effective, is grounded in freedom [Schelling]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 4. Tracking the Facts
A true belief isn't knowledge if it would be believed even if false. It should 'track the truth' [Nozick, by Dancy,J]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self
The basis of philosophy is the Self prior to experience, where it is the essence of freedom [Schelling]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 2. Sources of Free Will
Only idealism has given us the genuine concept of freedom [Schelling]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
In the instrumental view of rationality it only concerns means, and not ends [Nozick]
Is it rational to believe a truth which leads to permanent misery? [Nozick]
Rationality needs some self-consciousness, to also evaluate how we acquired our reasons [Nozick]
Rationality is normally said to concern either giving reasons, or reliability [Nozick]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / g. Will to power
Ultimately, all being is willing. The nature of primal being is the same as the nature of willing [Schelling]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
Freedom to live according to our own conception of the good is the ultimate value [Nozick, by Kymlicka]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
We don't choose our characters, yet we still claim credit for the actions our characters perform [Schelling]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 2. Ideal of Pleasure
If an experience machine gives you any experience you want, should you hook up for life? [Nozick]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
A minimal state should protect, but a state forcing us to do more is unjustified [Nozick]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 2. Anarchism
Individual rights are so strong that the state and its officials must be very limited in power [Nozick]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / c. Liberal equality
States can't enforce mutual aid on citizens, or interfere for their own good [Nozick]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / g. Liberalism critique
My Anarchy, State and Utopia neglected our formal social ties and concerns [Nozick on Nozick]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 4. Free market
If people hold things legitimately, just distribution is simply the result of free exchanges [Nozick, by Kymlicka]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 4. Property rights
Property is legitimate by initial acquisition, voluntary transfer, or rectification of injustice [Nozick, by Swift]
Nozick assumes initial holdings include property rights, but we can challenge that [Kymlicka on Nozick]
Can I come to own the sea, by mixing my private tomato juice with it? [Nozick]
How did the private property get started? If violence was involved, we can redistribute it [Kymlicka on Nozick]
If property is only initially acquired by denying the rights of others, Nozick can't get started [Kymlicka on Nozick]
Unowned things may be permanently acquired, if it doesn't worsen the position of other people [Nozick]
Maybe land was originally collectively owned, rather than unowned? [Cohen,GA on Nozick]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
Schelling sought a union between the productivities of nature and of the mind [Schelling, by Bowie]
Schelling made organisms central to nature, because mere mechanism could never produce them [Schelling, by Pinkard]