Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM, Friedrich Schlegel and Jonathan Kvanvig

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20 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 4. Later European Philosophy / c. Eighteenth century philosophy
22070 Irony is consciousness of abundant chaos [Schlegel,F]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
22069 Plato has no system. Philosophy is the progression of a mind and development of thoughts [Schlegel,F]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 3. Levels of Reality
16062 A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
16061 If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
16060 Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow]
16064 The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
19566 Epistemology does not just concern knowledge; all aspects of cognitive activity are involved [Kvanvig]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
19261 Understanding is seeing coherent relationships in the relevant information [Kvanvig]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 5. Aiming at Truth
19568 Making sense of things, or finding a good theory, are non-truth-related cognitive successes [Kvanvig]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / b. Transcendental idealism
22068 Poetry is transcendental when it connects the ideal to the real [Schlegel,F]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / c. Defeasibility
19567 The 'defeasibility' approach says true justified belief is knowledge if no undermining facts could be known [Kvanvig]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
19679 'Access' internalism says responsibility needs access; weaker 'mentalism' needs mental justification [Kvanvig]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 1. Epistemic virtues
19730 Epistemic virtues: love of knowledge, courage, caution, autonomy, practical wisdom... [Kvanvig]
19731 If epistemic virtues are faculties or powers, that doesn't explain propositional knowledge [Kvanvig]
19732 The value of good means of attaining truth are swamped by the value of the truth itself [Kvanvig]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
19678 Strong foundationalism needs strict inferences; weak version has induction, explanation, probability [Kvanvig]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
19570 Reliabilism cannot assess the justification for propositions we don't believe [Kvanvig]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 8. The Arts / b. Literature
22030 For poets free choice is supreme [Schlegel,F]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
22071 True love is ironic, in the contrast between finite limitations and the infinity of love [Schlegel,F]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 3. Angst
22029 Irony is the response to conflicts of involvement and attachment [Schlegel,F, by Pinkard]