Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM, G. Aldo Antonelli and Stephen S. Colvin

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20 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 2. Possibility of Metaphysics
20728 Metaphysics is hopeless with its present epistemology; common-sense realism is needed [Colvin]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 1. Argument
19115 You can 'rebut' an argument's conclusion, or 'undercut' its premises [Antonelli]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 1. Nonclassical Logics
19119 We infer that other objects are like some exceptional object, if they share some of its properties [Antonelli]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 12. Non-Monotonic Logic
19111 Reasoning may be defeated by new premises, or by finding out more about the given ones [Antonelli]
19114 Should we accept Floating Conclusions, derived from two arguments in conflict? [Antonelli]
19113 Weakest Link Principle: prefer the argument whose weakest link is the stronger [Antonelli]
19116 Non-monotonic core: Reflexivity, Cut, Cautious Monotonicity, Left Logical Equivalence, Right Weakening [Antonelli]
19117 We can rank a formula by the level of surprise if it were to hold [Antonelli]
19118 People don't actually use classical logic, but may actually use non-monotonic logic [Antonelli]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 10. Monotonicity
19110 In classical logic the relation |= has Monotony built into its definition [Antonelli]
19112 Cautious Monotony ignores proved additions; Rational Monotony fails if the addition's negation is proved [Antonelli]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 3. Levels of Reality
16062 A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
16061 If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
20726 We can only distinguish self from non-self if there is an inflexible external reality [Colvin]
20727 Common-sense realism rests on our interests and practical life [Colvin]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
20729 Arguments that objects are unknowable or non-existent assume the knower's existence [Colvin]
20730 If objects are doubted because their appearances change, that presupposes one object [Colvin]
20731 The idea that everything is relations is contradictory; relations are part of the concept of things [Colvin]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
16060 Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow]
16064 The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow]