13 ideas
16062 | A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16061 | If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow] |
7855 | Some suggest that materialism is empty, because 'physical' cannot be properly characterized [Mellor/Crane, by Papineau] |
16060 | Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16064 | The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow] |
6120 | Causation depends on intrinsic properties [Mellor/Crane] |
6121 | There are many psychophysicals laws - about the effects of sweets, colours and soft cushions [Mellor/Crane] |
6122 | No defences of physicalism can deprive psychology of the ontological authority of other sciences [Mellor/Crane] |
21733 | The right-wing conception of freedom is based on the idea of self-ownership [Cohen,GA] |
21739 | Plenty of people have self-ownership, but still lack autonomy [Cohen,GA] |
21736 | It is doubtful whether any private property was originally acquired legitimately [Cohen,GA] |
21734 | It is plausible that no one has an initial right to own land and natural resources [Cohen,GA] |
21735 | Every thing which is now private started out as unowned [Cohen,GA] |