Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM, G.H. von Wright and Francesco Orsi

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25 ideas

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 3. Levels of Reality
16062 A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
18680 To avoid misunderstandings supervenience is often expressed negatively: no A-change without B-change [Orsi]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
16061 If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
16060 Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow]
16064 The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
8361 What is true used to be possible, but it may no longer be so [Wright,GHv]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
18684 Rather than requiring an action, a reason may 'entice' us, or be 'eligible', or 'justify' it [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
18666 Value-maker concepts (such as courageous or elegant) simultaneously describe and evaluate [Orsi]
18667 The '-able' concepts (like enviable) say this thing deserves a particular response [Orsi]
18685 Final value is favoured for its own sake, and personal value for someone's sake [Orsi]
18679 Things are only valuable if something makes it valuable, and we can ask for the reason [Orsi]
18682 A complex value is not just the sum of the values of the parts [Orsi]
18683 Trichotomy Thesis: comparable values must be better, worse or the same [Orsi]
18686 The Fitting Attitude view says values are fitting or reasonable, and values are just byproducts [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value
18672 Values from reasons has the 'wrong kind of reason' problem - admiration arising from fear [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
18677 A thing may have final value, which is still derived from other values, or from relations [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / a. Normativity
18668 Truths about value entail normative truths about actions or attitudes [Orsi]
18670 The Buck-Passing view of normative values says other properties are reasons for the value [Orsi]
18669 Values can be normative in the Fitting Attitude account, where 'good' means fitting favouring [Orsi]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 5. Direction of causation
8363 p is a cause and q an effect (not vice versa) if manipulations of p change q [Wright,GHv]
8364 We can imagine controlling floods by controlling rain, but not vice versa [Wright,GHv]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / a. Observation of causation
8366 The very notion of a cause depends on agency and action [Wright,GHv]
8362 We give regularities a causal character by subjecting them to experiment [Wright,GHv]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / c. Conditions of causation
8360 We must further analyse conditions for causation, into quantifiers or modal concepts [Wright,GHv]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 2. Types of Laws
8365 Some laws are causal (Ohm's Law), but others are conceptual principles (conservation of energy) [Wright,GHv]