Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM, GE Hughes/M Cresswell and Auguste Comte

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22 ideas

1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 1. History of Ideas
12105 Our knowledge starts in theology, passes through metaphysics, and ends in positivism [Comte]
12104 All ideas must be understood historically [Comte]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
12112 Metaphysics is just the oversubtle qualification of abstract names for phenomena [Comte]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 2. Positivism
12106 Positivism gives up absolute truth, and seeks phenomenal laws, by reason and observation [Comte]
7491 The phases of human thought are theological, then metaphysical, then positivist [Comte, by Watson]
12111 Positivism is the final state of human intelligence [Comte]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
12114 Science can drown in detail, so we need broad scientists (to keep out the metaphysicians) [Comte]
12116 Only positivist philosophy can terminate modern social crises [Comte]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / b. Terminology of PL
9540 A 'value-assignment' (V) is when to each variable in the set V assigns either the value 1 or the value 0 [Hughes/Cresswell]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / d. Basic theorems of PL
9541 The Law of Transposition says (P→Q) → (¬Q→¬P) [Hughes/Cresswell]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 4. Soundness of PL
9543 The rules preserve validity from the axioms, so no thesis negates any other thesis [Hughes/Cresswell]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 4. Completeness
9544 A system is 'weakly' complete if all wffs are derivable, and 'strongly' if theses are maximised [Hughes/Cresswell]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 3. Levels of Reality
16062 A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
16061 If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
16060 Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow]
16064 The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 4. Pro-Empiricism
12108 All real knowledge rests on observed facts [Comte]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 1. Observation
12109 We must observe in order to form theories, but connected observations need prior theories [Comte]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
12107 Positivism explains facts by connecting particular phenomena with general facts [Comte]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
12115 Introspection is pure illusion; we can obviously observe everything except ourselves [Comte]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 7. Eliminating causation
12113 The search for first or final causes is futile [Comte]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / e. Anti scientific essentialism
12110 We can never know origins, purposes or inner natures [Comte]